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Implicit courtroom stereotypes are an urgent problem. When trial defendants 
are African American, as is disproportionately the case, they are vulnerable to im-
plicit fact finder stereotypes that threaten the presumption of innocence: uncon-
scious associations linking the defendants with violence, weaponry, hostility, ag-
gression, immorality, and guilt. Implicit-social-cognition research reveals that one 
valuable tool in combating this threat is individuating information—information 
that, through methods such as defendant testimony, brings an individual to 
unique life. 
Yet courts frequently chill defendant testimony by permitting impeachment 
by prior conviction. Courts determining whether criminal defendants should be 
impeached by their prior convictions use a multifactor test, one factor of which is 
“the importance of the defendant’s testimony.” This factor was designed to prevent 
defendant testimony from being chilled: if the testimony was important, then im-
peachment was to be avoided. Now, courts often invert this factor’s meaning: they 
find that if the defendant’s testimony is important, the government should be able 
to impeach it. The distortion of this factor means not only that impeachment is typ-
ically permitted—and defendants frequently silenced—but also that a valuable 
opportunity to tackle courtroom bias is lost. 
This Article proposes that the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” fac-
tor should be reclaimed as a means for defendants to argue that the individuating 
information that their testimony can offer militates against permitting impeach-
ment. When the defendant’s race risks triggering stereotypes that threaten the pre-
sumption of innocence, individuation represents a crucial part of the struggle for a 
fair trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recent study of DNA exonerees revealed that, despite their 
factual innocence, 91 percent of those with prior convictions 
waived their right to testify at trial.1 The most common reason 
given by their counsel was the fear of the impact of impeachment 
 
 1 John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud 477, 491 (2008).  
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by prior conviction.2 That fear was justified. First, in every case 
in which one of the exonerees with a criminal record did testify, 
the trial court permitted this type of impeachment;3 second, al-
lowing the jury to learn of a defendant’s criminal record increas-
es the rate of conviction by as much as 27 percent.4 A regime in 
which stories of innocence are kept from the fact finder by a well-
supported fear that they will be drowned out through prior con-
viction impeachment is one that needs scrutiny. 
Comparing early opinions on whether impeachment should 
be permitted with opinions that postdate the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE) reveals that in many instances an important 
opportunity for defendants—and fact finders—has been lost. The 
restoration of this opportunity offers the potential to combat one 
of the most significant threats to courtroom fairness: implicit ra-
cial stereotyping. 
The early case law emphasized that a paramount considera-
tion in determining whether to permit prior conviction impeach-
ment was whether the defendant would be chilled from testifying.5 
Even if prior conviction evidence was probative of the defendant’s 
credibility, and even if the probative value outweighed the preju-
dice, the risk that defendants might be deterred from testifying 
weighed heavily against permitting impeachment.6 
The case law that followed the enactment of the FRE ostensi-
bly preserved these early themes. “The importance of the defend-
ant’s testimony” is one factor in the multifactor test that most cir-
cuits and many states use in conducting the probative/prejudicial 
balancing test that the relevant rule of evidence requires.7 Yet 
federal and state judges often ignore this factor or treat it as if it 
were of little worth.8 Most strikingly, in many instances, judges 
 
 2 See id (“In almost all instances in which a defendant with a prior record did not 
testify, counsel for the wrongfully convicted defendant indicated that avoiding impeach-
ment was the principal reason the defendant did not take the stand.”). 
 3 Id at 479. 
 4 Id at 487 n 39, citing generally Harry Kalven Jr and Hans Zeisel, The American 
Jury (Little, Brown 1966).  
 5 See Part I.B. 
 6 See text accompanying notes 44–45.  
 7 For the probative/prejudicial balancing test, see FRE 609(a)(1)(B). For the use of 
this particular factor, see text accompanying notes 51, 69. 
 8 See notes 64–78 and accompanying text. See also Roderick Surratt, Prior-
Conviction Impeachment under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to 
Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 Syracuse L Rev 907, 938, 941 
(1980) (noting that the number of opinions in which courts discuss and apply all five fac-
tors is “relatively small”). 
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invert its root sense: whereas originally the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony militated against permitting impeach-
ment—under the theory that important testimony must be 
heard—now it often justifies impeachment, under the theory 
that important testimony must not go unchallenged.9 
The effect of this and other trends in impeachment law has 
been to make the granting of motions to impeach by prior con-
viction the default.10 As shown by the exoneree research, the im-
plications are troubling. When defendants waive their right to 
testify because of the fear of impeachment, important infor-
mation is kept from the fact finder—information that may estab-
lish innocence and that may help build a richer factual context 
for the fact finder’s decisionmaking. 
Research into implicit stereotyping and its amelioration 
shows why the collapse of the “importance of the defendant’s tes-
timony” factor is particularly significant. Implicit racial stereo-
typing constitutes one of the most significant, and intractable, 
threats to courtroom fairness. Those accused of crimes are dis-
proportionately people of color,11 and people of color are fre-
quently targets of implicit racial stereotyping.12 Those put on 
trial have the right to the presumption of innocence;13 implicit 
racial stereotyping by fact finders threatens that presumption, 
because when defendants are African American, unconscious as-
sociations are invoked between their race and concepts such as 
violence, weaponry, hostility, aggression, immorality,14 and—
most damning of all—criminal guilt.15 And yet, as research into 
implicit stereotyping expands from demonstrating the breadth of 
the phenomenon to exploring solutions,16 some hope emerges. 
Research in the area of social cognition indicates that when fact 
finders hear from a member of a stereotyped group, and particu-
larly when they hear information that individuates—or paints a 
unique picture of—that person, they are more likely to be able to 
 
 9 See text accompanying notes 53–62, 69–73. 
 10 See text accompanying notes 133–42. 
 11 Abbe Smith, Defending Those People, 10 Ohio St J Crim L 277, 287 (2012). 
 12 See text accompanying notes 181–91. 
 13 See, for example, Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 (1976). 
 14 See notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 15 See note 191 and accompanying text. 
 16 See David M. Amodio and Saaid A. Mendoza, Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive, 
Affective, and Motivational Underpinnings, in Bertram Gawronski and B. Keith Payne, 
eds, Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications 353, 
362 (Guilford 2010) (noting that the “holy grail of implicit race bias research is to change 
the underlying associations that form the basis of implicit bias”). 
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form judgments about that individual that are based on the evi-
dence rather than on stereotypes.17 
Forging new connections between impeachment law and the 
science of implicit stereotyping, this Article proposes that attor-
neys reclaim the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” fac-
tor as a vehicle for innovative defense arguments. When defend-
ants are the targets of stereotypes that threaten the 
presumption of innocence or the right to a fair trial, those argu-
ments could include the need to preclude prior conviction im-
peachment because it is vitally important for the fact finder to 
hear individuating testimony. This would serve not only to bring 
sense back into the multifactor test and to restore a key strand 
of case law underlying the rule but also to resist the trend to-
ward the automatic admission of impeachment evidence and the 
resulting silencing of defendants. 
Part I describes the contemporary rules governing the ad-
mission of prior conviction impeachment evidence and their 
roots. It illustrates the ways in which a factor that was original-
ly intended to aid defense objections to this evidence has lost its 
vitality and, in many instances, become a tool for the prosecu-
tion. This and other aspects of impeachment law have created a 
situation in which impeachment is routinely permitted and de-
fendants are frequently silenced. 
Part II illustrates the particular harms associated with the 
weakening of the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” fac-
tor by highlighting the risks of implicit racial stereotyping in the 
courtroom. When an African American is on trial, implicit racial 
stereotypes threaten the presumption of innocence by allowing 
fact finders to assume guilt—or elements of guilt—on the basis 
of the defendant’s race.18 When a defendant sits silently in the 
courtroom, these assumptions run riot, and efforts at tackling 
implicit courtroom bias have thus far had little success. Re-
search into social cognition, however, suggests that individuat-
ing information can combat stereotyping. 
Part III urges that the “importance of the defendant’s testi-
mony” factor should be revivified. Restoring its original meaning 
will enable courts to give weight to all of the factors in the im-
peachment test, will transform this factor—and the test—from a 
 
 17 See Part III.A. 
 18 This Article restricts itself to the consideration of implicit racial stereotypes and 
particularly those targeting African Americans, but its arguments are potentially appli-
cable to other stereotyped groups. 
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mere rubber stamp for impeachment, and will play a role in 
combating the extraordinary threat that implicit stereotypes 
pose to criminal defendants and to the presumption of inno-
cence. Part IV addresses possible objections. 
I.  IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION AND HOW A DEFENSE 
OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST 
This Part lays out the relevant aspects of the current federal 
rule governing impeachment by prior conviction, as well as its 
state analogues. It then describes the case law roots of the fed-
eral rule before examining the ways in which a key concern of 
that early case law—the risk that permitting impeachment 
would keep valuable defendant testimony from the fact finder—
has been neglected. The result of this neglect is that impeach-
ment by prior conviction evidence is easier to achieve and the si-
lencing of the defendant is more likely to result. 
A. FRE 609 and Its State Analogues 
FRE 609 governs impeachment by prior conviction in the fed-
eral courts. Two types of convictions can be admitted into evi-
dence to impeach criminal defendants. The first consists of those 
convictions with regard to which “the court can readily determine 
that establishing the elements of the crime required proving—or 
the [defendant’s] admitting—a dishonest act or false statement.”19 
Under FRE 609(a)(2), these must be admitted into evidence.20 The 
second, with which this Article is concerned, consists of convic-
tions for crimes that were “punishable by death or by imprison-
ment for more than one year.”21 Under FRE 609(a)(1)(B), this type 
must be admitted “if the probative value of the evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to [the] defendant.”22 
Prior convictions are admissible under FRE 609 for the pur-
pose of “attacking a [testifying defendant’s] character for truth-
fulness.”23 Naturally, there is a risk that they will be used for 
other, forbidden purposes, such as creating the inference that if 
a defendant “did it once, he did it again,” or that if he “did it 
 
 19 FRE 609(a)(2). 
 20 FRE 609(a)(2). 
 21 FRE 609(a)(1). 
 22 FRE 609(a)(1)(B). 
 23 FRE 609(a). 
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once,” it would be best if he were incarcerated.24 The drafters of 
FRE 609 were alert to this risk, and they made the standard for 
impeaching criminal defendants more exacting than the stand-
ard for impeaching other witnesses.25 In addition, defendants are 
entitled to jury instructions prohibiting jurors from using this 
evidence for these forbidden purposes.26 
Supreme Court cases have set parameters for the admin-
istration of FRE 609. In Luce v United States,27 for example, the 
Court held that if defendants exercise their right not to testify, 
they have no right to a subsequent appeal of a decision that they 
 
 24 See, for example, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, Character Evidence, 
and the New Criminal Law, 2010 Utah L Rev 723, 732–33. 
 25 See FRE 609(a)(1)(A) (stating that convictions “punishable by death or by im-
prisonment for more than one year . . . must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil 
case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant”). FRE 403 allows 
judges to exclude evidence only when its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by 
the risk of one or more problematic phenomena, including “unfair prejudice.” FRE 403 
(emphasis added). See also Joseph M. McLaughlin, Jack B. Weinstein, and Margaret A. 
Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United 
States Courts § 609.05[3][a] at 609-37 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 2014): 
The contrast between a criminal defendant and other witnesses [ ] appears in 
the fact that Rule 403 protects witnesses other than a criminal defendant only 
against the danger of “unfair prejudice” from evidence of their prior convic-
tions, while Rule 609 more broadly protects the defendant against any “preju-
dicial effect” of evidence of prior convictions. 
(citation omitted). See also United States v Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F3d 33, 46 (1st Cir 2000) 
(noting that “Rule 609 . . . is primarily concerned with potential unfairness to a defendant 
when his prior convictions are offered”); Jack B. Weinstein, Margaret A. Berger, and 
Joseph M. McLaughlin, 3 Weinstein’s Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the 
United States Courts and State Courts ¶ 609[04] at 609-42 (Matthew Bender 1996), quot-
ing FRE 609, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1990 Amendments: 
The amended Rule 609(a)(1) was intended to resolve problems of fairness by 
treating criminal defendants differently from other witnesses. The Advisory 
Committee was aware of the “unique risk of prejudice” faced by criminal de-
fendants who want to testify on their own behalf: that prior conviction evidence 
will be “misused by a jury as propensity evidence.” 
See also Federal Rules of Evidence, S Rep No 93-1277, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 14 (1974), re-
printed in 1974 USCCAN 7051, 7061 (“[T]he danger of unfair prejudice is far greater 
when the accused, as opposed to other witnesses, testifies, because the jury may be prej-
udiced not merely on the question of credibility but also on the ultimate question of guilt 
or innocence.”); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Inno-
cence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 Emory L J 135, 145–46 (1989) (“The purpose of 
the balancing test in Rule 609(a)(1) was to prod defendants to testify.”); People v Allen, 
420 NW2d 499, 523 (Mich 1988) (explaining that with nondefendant defense witnesses 
and prosecution witnesses, “the only ‘prejudice’ arises out of the fact that the witness 
may not be believed, as the nondefendant witness’ general character will not be consid-
ered by the jury”). 
 26 See FRE 105. 
 27 469 US 38 (1984). 
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could be impeached—even if that decision may have led them 
not to testify.28 
Numerous states have adopted rules that exactly or closely 
mirror FRE 609.29 Many have also adopted the limitations on 
appellate review of impeachment rulings that Luce established 
at the federal level; some, however, have rejected Luce and per-
mit appeals of impeachment rulings even when the defendant 
exercised his or her right not to testify.30 
The text of FRE 609 gives no guidance to courts with respect 
to how they should conduct the required balancing test when 
they assess whether felony convictions should be admitted as 
impeachment evidence; it gives no guidance, in other words, on 
how courts should decide whether “the probative value of the ev-
idence outweighs its prejudicial effect to [the] defendant.”31 
However, the great majority of federal appellate courts, as well 
as many states, have developed versions of a multifactor test.32 
This test has its roots in case law that predated and shaped FRE 
609. The next Section describes those roots. 
B. The Case Law Roots of FRE 609 
This Section describes the two key cases underlying FRE 
609—Luck v United States33 and Gordon v United States.34 It fo-
cuses, in particular, on one of the ideas emphasized in both of 
those cases: that courts should be very alert to the risk that 
granting motions to impeach by prior conviction might deter de-
fendant testimony and thus might deprive the fact finder of val-
uable information. These opinions describe this consideration as 
one of the most important of the factors—or the most important 
of the factors—to weigh. As Part I.C describes, post-FRE case 
law has preserved the importance of the defendant’s testimony 
as a relevant factor—but its interpretation has greatly reduced 
its usefulness to the defense and to the fact finder. 
 
 28 Id at 43. 
 29 For a helpful summary of state analogues to FRE 609, see Blume, 5 J Empirical 
Legal Stud at 499–505 (cited in note 1). 
 30 See text accompanying note 290. 
 31 FRE 609(a)(1)(B). The Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 609 also provide no 
guidance on this issue. 
 32 See text accompanying notes 46–51. 
 33 348 F2d 763 (DC Cir 1965). 
 34 383 F2d 936 (DC Cir 1967). 
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1. Luck v United States. 
Luck, a 1965 decision from the DC Circuit, served as the 
“prototype” for FRE 609(a)(1).35 The case interpreted a provision 
of the DC Code, which appeared to permit the impeachment of 
any witness on the basis of a criminal conviction.36 The court de-
clared that, in fact, “sound judicial discretion” should operate to 
determine whether a defendant could be impeached by a prior 
conviction.37 The court repeatedly invoked the risk of chilling a 
defendant’s testimony as a reason to refrain from granting a mo-
tion to impeach. There might well be, for example, “cases where 
the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be 
helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant’s story than 
by the defendant’s foregoing that opportunity because of the fear 
of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction.”38 The court stated 
that when a trial court exercises its discretion, a number of fac-
tors might be relevant, including, “above all, the extent to which 
it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case 
for the jury to hear the defendant’s story than to know of a prior 
conviction.”39 The court went on to say that 
[t]he goal of a criminal trial is the disposition of the charge 
in accordance with the truth. The possibility of a rehearsal 
of the defendant’s criminal record in a given case, especially 
 
 35 McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at 
§ 609App.101[1] at 609App.-21 (cited in note 25) (“In the last few years before the rules 
of evidence went into effect, a number of circuits were influenced by the line of cases im-
plementing the 1965 District of Columbia decision in Luck v. United States which ulti-
mately . . . emerged as the prototype for Rule 609(a)(1) and (b).”). 
 36 DC Code § 14-305 (1961):  
No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceed-
ings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be giv-
en in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-
examination of the witness or by evidence aliunde [that is, extrinsic evidence]; 
and the party cross-examining him shall not be concluded by his answers as to 
such matters.  
 37 Luck, 348 F2d at 768. 
 38 Id. See also id at 768 n 7, quoting Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of 
Evidence § 43 at 94 (West 1954) (“On balance it seems that to permit . . . one accused of 
crime to tell his story without incurring the overwhelming prejudice likely to ensue from 
disclosing past convictions, is a more just, humane and expedient solution.”). 
 39 Luck, 348 F2d at 769 (emphasis added) (mentioning, in addition, “the nature of 
the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, [and] the age and circumstances of 
the defendant”) (citation omitted). 
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if it means that the jury will be left without one version of 
the truth, may or may not contribute to that objective.40  
2. Gordon v United States. 
The DC Circuit further developed its analysis two years lat-
er in Gordon, another pre-FRE opinion. Then-Judge Warren 
Burger authored the opinion, and in it he announced the aim of 
clarifying the issue of prior conviction impeachment,41 motivated 
in part by a dissenting opinion written the year before, in which 
a colleague of his had stated that “[t]he whole subject [of prior 
conviction impeachment] needs further study in the interest of 
the integrity of trials for crime.”42 The Gordon court summarized 
certain points that were made in Luck, including that a defend-
ant with a criminal record “may ask the court to consider 
whether it is more important for the jury to hear his story than 
to know about prior convictions in relation to his credibility.”43 
Among the many factors that might be relevant to a trial court’s 
determination, “[o]ne important consideration is what the effect 
will be if the defendant does not testify out of fear of being prej-
udiced because of impeachment by prior convictions.”44 Indeed, 
the need to avoid chilling defendant testimony could trump, 
even though the weighing of prejudice and probative value 
might seem to favor the prosecution: 
Even though a judge might find that the prior convictions are 
relevant to credibility and the risk of prejudice to the defend-
ant does not warrant their exclusion, he may nevertheless 
conclude that it is more important that the jury have the 
benefit of the defendant’s version of the case than to have the 
defendant remain silent out of fear of impeachment.45 
Thus, Gordon echoed Luck in characterizing the silencing of 
a criminal defendant as a possible hindrance to the cause of 
truth. Both courts emphasized the risk that, by permitting prior 
conviction impeachment, a trial judge might chill important de-
fendant testimony. Indeed, while both courts indicated that trial 
 
 40 Id. 
 41 Gordon, 383 F2d at 938. 
 42 Stevens v United States, 370 F2d 485, 486 (DC Cir 1966) (Fahy dissenting). For 
the role Stevens played in motivating the Gordon opinion, see Gordon, 383 F2d at 938. 
 43 Gordon, 383 F2d at 939. 
 44 Id at 940. 
 45 Id at 940–41. 
 2016] Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony 845 
 
judges might consider a number of factors in making their deci-
sions about prior conviction impeachment, they gave this factor 
an exalted status: Luck suggested that it was the most im-
portant factor of all, and Gordon indicated that, regardless of 
the results of the balancing test, it might persuade a court to 
preclude this form of impeachment.  
C. The Case Law Roots Become Twisted 
This strand of case law was engrafted onto the FRE in 1976 
by the Seventh Circuit in United States v Mahone.46 That court 
was interpreting a provision of then-new FRE 609 that was, in 
all relevant respects, identical to the current FRE 609(a)(1)(B).47 
The court presented a slimmed-down, smoothed-out version of 
five factors mentioned in Gordon,48 describing them as some of 
the considerations that trial courts should weigh: 
(1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. 
(2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness’ sub-
sequent history. 
(3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged 
crime. 
(4) The importance of the defendant’s testimony. 
(5) The centrality of the credibility issue.49 
Mahone contained no further discussion of these factors. 
Thus, while the factor termed “the importance of the defendant’s 
testimony” originated in the discussions in Luck and Gordon of 
how vital it was to ensure that the threat of impeachment not 
chill defendant testimony, its decontextualized inclusion in 
Mahone left it vulnerable to interpretations that departed from 
its origins as a protection for the defendant. Similarly, while 
 
 46 537 F2d 922 (7th Cir 1976). 
 47 Compare FRE 609(a)(1)(B) (stating that evidence of crimes “punishable by death 
or by imprisonment for more than one year . . . must be admitted in a criminal case in 
which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect”), with Mahone, 537 F2d at 928 (excerpting an early version of FRE 
609(a)(1)): 
[With respect to] attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a 
criminal conviction . . . for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was pun-
ishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence . . . 
must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant. 
 48 Gordon, 383 F2d at 940–41. 
 49 Mahone, 537 F2d at 929. 
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Luck and Gordon presented the factor as a consideration that 
could trump the result of balancing relevance and prejudice,50 its 
inclusion in a list of considerations for a court conducting such a 
balancing threatened to remove its status as the most important 
consideration—one that stood apart from the balancing—and to 
make it instead just one more factor for a court to run through 
as it conducts the balancing. 
As this Section explores, these threats have been realized. A 
multifactor test that includes “the importance of the defendant’s 
testimony” or something similar has proved a popular one for 
courts to run through as they conduct the FRE 609(a)(1)(B) bal-
ancing. All but two of the federal appellate courts have adopted 
it.51 The “importance of the defendant’s testimony” no longer is a 
trump card but rather sits patiently in the deck as “the fourth 
factor.”52 As courts run through the factors, they typically fail to 
acknowledge—much less honor—the roots of this factor as a pro-
tection for the defendant, and indeed as an opportunity for the 
defense to prevent this kind of impeachment, no matter the re-
sult of the balancing test. In many instances, the meaning of 
this factor has been inverted so that courts take the importance 
of the defendant’s testimony as a reason to permit, rather than 
prohibit, impeachment. As this Section shows, not only courts—
federal and state—but also defense attorneys and commentators 
have distorted or neglected the root meaning of this factor. Part 
I.D explores the consequences. 
1. Courts and a lost opportunity. 
Numerous courts have inverted the meaning of this factor by 
treating the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” as a reason 
to permit, rather than prohibit, the impeachment of that testimo-
ny.53 Nor is this just a case of trial courts using the considerable 
 
 50 See text accompanying notes 39, 44–45.  
 51 The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and DC 
Circuits use this factor or a close variant. See United States v Brito, 427 F3d 53, 64 (1st Cir 
2005); United States v Hawley, 554 F2d 50, 53 (2d Cir 1977); United States v Caldwell, 760 
F3d 267, 286 (3d Cir 2014); United States v Acosta, 763 F2d 671, 695 n 30 (5th Cir 1985); 
United States v Moore, 917 F2d 215, 234 (6th Cir 1990); United States v Causey, 9 F3d 
1341, 1344 (7th Cir 1993); United States v Browne, 829 F2d 760, 762–63 (9th Cir 1987); 
United States v Smalls, 752 F3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir 2014); United States v Pritchard, 973 
F2d 905, 909 (11th Cir 1992); United States v Jackson, 627 F2d 1198, 1209 (DC Cir 1980). 
As discussed below, even judges and lawyers in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits sometimes 
use this factor. See text accompanying note 266. 
 52 See, for example, United States v Darr, 2007 WL 2700064, *1–2 (CD Ill). 
 53 See Ordover, 38 Emory L J at 199–200 (cited in note 25):  
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discretion that they are given in making their impeachment de-
cisions—discretion that has been likened to “a wild stallion in 
our usually well domesticated barnyard.”54 Several federal cir-
cuit courts have inverted the original meaning of this factor—
the Sixth,55 Seventh,56 and Ninth57 Circuits—and district courts 
within other circuits—the Second,58 Third,59 Fifth,60 and Tenth61 
Circuits—have done the same.62 
In a less radical break from the factor’s roots—but still a 
significant one, given the emphasis in early case law on the im-
portance of this factor63—other federal opinions give it little or 
no weight. Even though these opinions may lay out the full list 
 
Where the defendant’s testimony is crucial to the defense, one might expect 
that the courts would give serious attention to the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test 
that places the burden on the prosecution and favors the defense. Yet, what 
seems to occur is that courts will acknowledge that the defendant’s evidence is 
important; that credibility is the central issue; and, therefore, the prior convic-
tion must be admitted to impeach the defendant’s credibility. This is the oppo-
site of the policy expressed by the line of authority that led to the adoption of 
Rule 609(a). 
(citation omitted). 
 54 State v McClure, 692 P2d 579, 589 (Or 1984), quoting Maurice Rosenberg, The 
Discretion of the Trial Judge and Its Implications, 4 Trial Judges’ J 4, 4 (July 1965). 
 55 See United States v Frazier, 314 Fed Appx 801, 805 (6th Cir 2008). 
 56 See United States v Nururdin, 8 F3d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir 1993). 
 57 See Browne, 829 F2d at 763–64; United States v Alexander, 48 F3d 1477, 1489 
(9th Cir 1995); United States v Avila-Castorena, 1989 WL 90230, *1 (9th Cir). 
 58 See, for example, United States v Bumagin, 2015 WL 5725870, *11 (EDNY). 
 59 See, for example, United States v Rosato, 1999 WL 58577, *3 (ED Pa) (finding the 
conviction inadmissible “despite the importance of the Defendant’s testimony and the 
centrality of his credibility”). 
 60 See, for example, Crocker v Dretke, 2003 WL 22410570, *6 (ND Tex) (“Where . . . 
a defendant testifies professing his [innocence] and presents no alibi defense, the im-
portance of the defendant’s testimony and his credibility escalates as does the need for 
the State to be afforded the opportunity to impeach his credibility.”). 
 61 See, for example, United States v Willis, 2014 WL 2589475, *2 (ND Okla) (ex-
cluding a prior conviction, despite the significance of the defendant’s testimony, because 
the multiplicity of witnesses against him indicated that there was “far less of a need for 
the government to undermine [the defendant’s] testimony through impeachment”). 
 62 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not adopted the Mahone test. For the 
Fourth Circuit’s approach, see, for example, United States v Ledingham, 340 Fed Appx 
150, 152 (4th Cir 2009) (treating the similarity between the prior conviction and the 
charged offense as the only relevant factor); United States v Sanders, 964 F2d 295, 297–
98 (4th Cir 1992) (identifying only the remoteness in time, the similarity to the present 
offense, and the bearing “on the likelihood that defendant would testify truthfully” as the 
relevant factors). For the approach among district courts in the Eighth Circuit, see, for 
example, United States v O’Neil, 839 F Supp 2d 1030, 1035–36 (SD Iowa 2011) (consider-
ing only whether the prior conviction contained “any element of dishonesty,” the “simi-
larity between this Defendant’s prior conviction and the current charge against him,” 
and the lapse of time since the prior conviction). 
 63 See Part I.B. 
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of factors, when it comes time to apply the factors they often 
omit any application of the “importance” factor.64 In many opin-
ions, interpretations of the fifth factor—the “centrality of the 
credibility issue”—contribute to the weakness of the importance 
factor. Opinions often treat these two factors as virtually synon-
ymous,65 merge their analyses under one heading,66 or indicate 
that the two factors are a “wash”67 and cancel each other out, 
since even if the importance of the defendant’s testimony were to 
militate against permitting impeachment, the centrality of the 
credibility issue would necessarily push in the other direction—
in a way that makes them both a nullity.68  
In the many states that use something like the “importance 
of the defendant’s testimony” factor in interpreting their ver-
sions of FRE 609, opinions display similar inversions and aban-
donments of that factor’s root meaning. The highest courts of at 
least twenty states apply a version of this factor,69 and one sees 
within those twenty states the same tendencies as in the federal 
 
 64 See, for example, United States v Harper, 2010 WL 1507869, *5 (ED Wis); United 
States v Pettiford, 238 FRD 33, 41–43 (DDC 2006); United States v Grove, 844 F Supp 
1495, 1497–98 (D Utah 1994); United States v Bean, 1991 WL 26471, *2 (9th Cir). 
 65 See, for example, United States v Stolica, 2010 WL 538233, *2 (SD Ill); THK 
America, Inc v NSK, Ltd, 917 F Supp 563, 570–71 (ND Ill 1996). 
 66 See, for example, United States v Sallins, 1993 WL 427358, *4 (ED Pa) (treating 
these factors under one heading); United States v Ketner, 1987 WL 36629, *4 (6th Cir) 
(treating these factors together in the same paragraph). 
 67 Jackson v State, 668 A2d 8, 20 (Md 1995) (Bell dissenting) (“I am prepared to 
consider factors (4) and (5) as being a wash, they counterbalance and negate each other.”). 
 68 See, for example, United States v Jackson, 1995 WL 337067, *2 (ND Ill) (“[T]he 
importance of Stephans’ testimony makes the issue of his credibility equally critical and 
supports the admission of potentially impeaching evidence.”). 
 69 These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See, for example, State 
v Green, 29 P3d 271, 274 (Ariz 2001); Hubbard v State, 946 SW2d 663, 667 (Ark 1997); 
Clay v State, 725 SE2d 260, 272 (Ga 2012); Scalissi v State, 759 NE2d 618, 625 (Ind 
2001); State v Redmond, 803 NW2d 112, 123–24 (Iowa 2011); Cure v State, 26 A3d 899, 
914, 917 (Md 2011); People v Finley, 431 NW2d 19, 22 (Mich 1988); State v Swanson, 707 
NW2d 645, 654 (Minn 2006); Johnson v State, 666 S2d 499, 503 (Miss 1995); State v 
Hickey, 523 A2d 60, 64 (NH 1986); State v Mora, 950 P2d 789, 803 (NM 1997), recognized 
as overruled on other grounds, Kersey v Hatch, 237 P3d 683, 689 (NM 2010); State v 
Stewart, 646 NW2d 712, 716 (ND 2002); Hardiman v State, 798 P2d 222, 224 (Okla Crim 
App 1990); McClure, 692 P2d at 585, 588–89; State v Colf, 525 SE2d 246, 248 (SC 2000); 
Theus v State, 845 SW2d 874, 880 (Tex Crim App 1992); State v Banner, 717 P2d 1325, 
1334 (Utah 1986); State v Brewer, 12 A3d 554, 556–57 (Vt 2010); State v Pam, 659 P2d 
454, 459 (Wash 1983), overruled on other grounds, State v Brown, 782 P2d 1013, 1025 
(Wash 1989). While the factors are “not necessarily mandated” in South Dakota, they 
appear in that state’s case law. State v King, 346 NW2d 750, 751–52 (SD 1984). 
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system to invert the meaning of the factor,70 ignore it in applica-
tion,71 merge it with the fifth factor (the “centrality of the credi-
bility issue”),72 or declare that it and the fifth factor cancel each 
other out.73 The Tennessee Supreme Court, while acknowledging 
that examination of the factors “may be useful to trial judges in 
some cases,” has declined to adopt them.74 The court based its 
decision, at least in part, on its rejection of the “importance of 
the defendant’s testimony” factor, of which it said the following: 
[W]e are somewhat at a loss to know what factors of a mur-
der case render the defendant’s testimony more important 
than in others and how to equate that situation with the ex-
ercise of the Fifth Amendment [right to testify]. In short, we 
reject the use of that factor as having any significance what-
soever in balancing probative value with prejudicial effect.75 
As suggested by this quotation, some states have lost sight 
of the origins of the factor as a potential trump card: a consider-
ation that could militate against permitting impeachment even 
if the probative value of the conviction might outweigh its preju-
dicial value.76 The Supreme Court of Michigan, even while citing 
Luck and Gordon,77 declared that one must line up the factors, 
as if in an “equation,” on either the probative value side or the 
prejudicial effect side, and that the “importance of the defend-
ant’s testimony” factor belongs on the prejudicial effect side: 
“For purposes of the prejudice factor, only the similarity to the 
 
 70 See, for example, Gonzalez v State, 134 S3d 350, 354–55 (Miss App 2013); Fulp v 
State, 745 A2d 438, 444 (Md Spec App 2000); Dowdy v State, 672 NE2d 948, 952 (Ind 
App 1996). 
 71 See, for example, Smith v State, 771 SE2d 8, 11–12 (Ga App 2015); State v 
Cooper, 687 SE2d 62, 69 (SC App 2009); Stewart, 646 NW2d at 716–17; Sims v State, 766 
SW2d 20, 21–22 (Ark App 1989). 
 72 See, for example, Cure, 26 A3d at 917; Brewer, 12 A3d at 556; Swanson, 707 
NW2d at 655–56. 
 73 See McClure, 692 P2d at 591; Jackson, 668 A2d at 16. The Michigan Supreme 
Court, concluding that the importance factor and the credibility factor contradicted each 
other, has resolved the issue by excising the credibility factor. Allen, 420 NW2d at 520 
(“It is our view that it is the effect on the decisional process if the defendant does not tes-
tify which must predominate and so the contradicting ‘credibility contest’ factor must 
therefore be eliminated.”). 
 74 State v Sheffield, 676 SW2d 542, 548 (Tenn 1984). 
 75 Id at 549. 
 76 See Part I.B. 
 77 See Allen, 420 NW2d at 510–12. 
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charged offense and the importance of the defendant’s testimony 
to the decisional process would be considered.”78 
2. Defense briefs and a lost opportunity. 
When courts fail to give appropriate weight and meaning to 
the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor, it is not 
typically because they are rejecting or overlooking powerful ar-
guments from defense counsel. Defense attorneys are implicated 
in the lost opportunity represented by this factor because they 
often participate in the same distortion and weakening of the 
factor that court opinions display. Thus, within numerous cir-
cuits—the Third,79 Fifth,80 Sixth,81 Seventh,82 and Ninth83 Cir-
cuits—defense attorneys have filed briefs in which the root 
meaning of the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor 
is inverted. In other words, defense attorneys buy into the no-
tion that the more important the defendant’s testimony, the 
more important it is that it be impeached. As a result, they are 
left in the bizarre posture of arguing that their clients’ testimony 
is “not that particularly important.”84 These briefs seem to ig-
nore or forget that the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” 
factor is rooted in their clients’ constitutional right to testify.85 
 
 78 Id at 522 (“For purposes of the probativeness side of the equation, only an objec-
tive analysis of the degree to which the crime is indicative of veracity and the vintage of 
the conviction would be considered, not either party’s need for the evidence.”) (citations 
omitted). See also Mich Rule Evid 609(b) (requiring courts to consider “only the age of 
the conviction and the degree to which a conviction . . . is indicative of veracity” in de-
termining probative value, and “only the conviction’s similarity to the charged offense 
and the possible effects on the decisional process if admitting the evidence causes the 
defendant to elect not to testify” in determining prejudicial effect). 
 79 See, for example, Brief for Appellant, United States v Hundley, Docket No 94-
3196, *12 (3d Cir filed July 11, 1994) (available on Westlaw at 1994 WL 16168058). 
 80 See, for example, Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United States v Compean, Docket 
No 01-50099, *15–16 (5th Cir filed May 25, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 
34155141). 
 81 See, for example, Final Brief of Defendant/Appellant Thomas Jeffress, United 
States v Jeffress, Docket No 06-6510, *27–28 (6th Cir filed Mar 10, 2008) (available on 
Westlaw at 2008 WL 4574176). 
 82 See, for example, United States v Thomas, 79 Fed Appx 908, 914 (7th Cir 2003) 
(citing the defendant’s arguments). 
 83 See, for example, Appellant’s Opening Brief, United States v Martinez-Aguilar, 
Docket No 99-50253, *11–12 (9th Cir filed Feb 2, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 
WL 34001874). 
 84 Id at *11. See also Thomas, 79 Fed Appx at 914 (citing the defendant’s argument 
that “his testimony was unimportant”). 
 85 See, for example, Jackson, 668 A2d at 16 (“Factors four and five are restatements 
of the considerations that underlie the Rule: balancing the defendant’s right to testify 
against the State’s right to impeach the witness on cross-examination.”). 
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They seem to ignore or forget the monumental nature of the de-
cision to testify, in the face of risks that include eviscerating 
cross-examination,86 skeptical fact finders,87 possible perjury 
charges,88 and steep sentencing enhancements.89 These are risks 
that few take,90 and they are generally not taken without good 
reason.91 Never mind any of that, these briefs seem to say: the 
proffered testimony is not so important that anyone should 
bother to impeach it. 
The prosecution, too, frequently adopts this inverted meaning, 
which leaves it arguing that impeachment needs to be permitted 
because the defendant’s proffered testimony is “absolutely cru-
cial,”92 “critical,”93 or the “keystone of his case.”94 Ninth Circuit 
prosecutors have taken this position, although they appear to 
work from a template that contains a Freudian error, since they 
argue that “[t]he importance of [the defendant’s] testimony cannot 
 
 86 See United States v Libby, 475 F Supp 2d 73, 93 (DDC 2007) (“[A] defendant’s 
choice to testify inevitably presents the possibility of a devastating cross-examination, 
while declining to testify may mean that the accused gives up the chance to put the most 
probative evidence in his favor before the jury.”). 
 87 See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 BC L Rev 563, 
576–77 (2014). 
 88 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 
NYU L Rev 1449, 1460 (2005) (“Even truthful defendants risk perjury charges and sen-
tencing enhancements by contradicting the government’s evidence.”). 
 89 For examples of courts upholding sentencing enhancements for perjury, see 
United States v Dunnigan, 507 US 87, 96–98 (1993); United States v Grayson, 438 US 41, 
54–55 (1978).  
 90 See Surratt, 31 Syracuse L Rev at 912 (cited in note 8) (“Because of the wide-
spread belief that jurors are incapable of complying with the limiting instruction, it is 
well known that defense attorneys frequently advise their clients who have criminal rec-
ords not to take the stand.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 91 See, for example, Charles E. Feldmann, Should a Criminal Defendant Testify? 
(Feldmann Nagel, LLC, Sept 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/A7GT-34FE (“In my 
experience, there would have to be a very good reason, above and beyond my client’s in-
nocence, for [testifying] to be a good idea.”); Frederick Leatherman, Will the Defendant 
Testify or Not Testify? (Frederick Leatherman Law Blog, July 6, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L9C9-89BT (“I advised my clients not to testify, unless there was some 
specific reason why I believed they had to testify.”). 
 92 Brief for Appellee United States, United States v Dunn, Docket No 99-50641, *18 
(9th Cir filed Feb 22, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 WL 34001422). See also Brief 
for the United States, United States v Taylor, Docket No 98-4141, *46 (11th Cir filed 
Mar 4, 1999) (available on Westlaw at 1999 WL 33643277) (arguing that the defend-
ant’s testimony was important to his nullification defense and that it therefore justi-
fied impeachment). 
 93 Brief for the United States, United States v Colon, Docket No 10-15099, *50 
(11th Cir filed May 17, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2118492) (arguing that 
one defendant’s testimony was “critical to establishing his lack of intent”). 
 94 Brief for Appellee, United States v Agtuca, Docket No 94-30257, *33 (9th Cir filed 
Mar 29, 1995) (available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 17116196). 
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be understated [sic].”95 As part of its arsenal, the prosecution is 
using a factor originally designed to assist the defense;96 the fact 
that in doing so it relies on a template—and a typographically 
erroneous one at that—suggests that it may be encountering lit-
tle resistance from the other side. 
Even when defense attorneys refrain from inverting the root 
meaning of this factor, they often fail to give it proper weight 
and meaning. Defense briefs frequently ignore the factor97 or 
merge it with the credibility factor.98 
One recent case illustrates the extent to which defense at-
torneys have given up on the usefulness of the “importance of 
the defendant’s testimony” factor. A defense brief in the Seventh 
Circuit—the home of Mahone—argued that both the fourth and 
fifth factors should be excised,99 since their effect is to “ensure 
prior convictions will be admitted.”100 
3. Commentators and a lost opportunity. 
Numerous commentators have also given up on the useful-
ness of this factor to both the defense and the fact finder. One of 
the leading contemporary scholars of prior conviction impeach-
ment—Professor Jeffrey Bellin—cites a number of commentators 
 
 95 Brief for Appellee United States, United States v Torres, Docket No 03-50589, 
*18 (9th Cir filed Apr 2, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 1125611) (“The im-
portance of Torres’ testimony cannot be understated. He was the only witness to testify 
at trial who could tell the jury whether or not he knew there was an alien concealed in 
the vehicle.”). See also Brief for Appellee United States, United States v Aguila-Montes 
de Oca, Docket No 05-50170, *29 (9th Cir filed Sept 27, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 
2005 WL 3577835) (“The importance of Aguila’s testimony cannot be understated: it was 
crucial given his denial of intent to commit the crime. He was the only witness to testify 
at trial who could tell the jury whether or not he intended to enter the United States.”). 
 96 See Part I.B. 
 97 See, for example, Brief of Appellant, United States v Mayes, Docket No 01-60095, 
*14–15 (5th Cir filed May 30, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 34154604).  
 98 See, for example, Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United States v Parks, 
Docket No 90-50189, *33 (9th Cir filed Oct 24, 1990) (available on Westlaw at 1990 WL 
10534042) (“[T]he defendant’s credibility (factors 4 and 5) was not the central issue in 
the case.”); Defendant’s Brief, United States v Perkins, Docket No 88-5237, *33 (9th Cir 
filed June 29, 1990) (available on Westlaw at 1990 WL 10084595) (stating that the court 
must “determine the importance of the defendant’s testimony in the light of the centrali-
ty of the credibility issues”). 
 99 Brief and Required Short Appendix of Appellant Lamar Tucker, United States v 
Tucker, Docket No 13-1403, *29–30 (7th Cir filed July 10, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 
2013 WL 3803045). 
 100 Id at *29. 
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who have been skeptical about the factor’s operability,101 but he 
then goes further, declaring that the factor, “as originally in-
tended, is rendered meaningless in the wake of Luce.”102 To rem-
edy this, he considers merely “lopping off the fourth and fifth 
Mahone factors,”103 but he concludes that despite the fact that 
there are “undoubtedly serious substantive flaws in the fourth 
and fifth Mahone factors, the excision of these factors would 
leave more subtle underlying flaws untouched.”104 He therefore 
advocates getting rid of the Mahone factors altogether, in favor 
of a new analysis that is “miles from the current state of the fed-
eral case law”105 and that does not inquire into the importance 
vel non of the defendant’s testimony.106 
 
 101 Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door 
to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 UC Davis L Rev 289, 
318–19 (2008), citing Ordover, 38 Emory L J at 199 (cited in note 25), and Surratt, 31 
Syracuse L Rev at 942–45 (cited in note 8):  
Soon after Mahone was decided . . . [c]ommentators noted that Mahone’s fourth 
and fifth factors, “the importance of the defendant’s testimony” and “the cen-
trality of the credibility issue,” not only lacked explicit legislative authoriza-
tion, but also could not be applied in a “principled” manner. In essence, the fac-
tors cancel each other out. To the extent a defendant’s testimony is “important” 
(for example, if the defendant is the key defense witness), his credibility be-
comes “central” in equal degree, leading to a curious equipoise. . . . Thus, the 
fourth and fifth Mahone factors seemed to have no practical significance at all, 
existing in a rough state of equipoise that prevented either factor from impact-
ing the overall impeachment calculus. 
(citations omitted). 
 102 Bellin, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 323 (cited in note 101). Bellin bases this claim on 
the fact that if a trial court delays its decision on prior conviction impeachment until the 
defendant has already testified, the trial court will not need to consider the risk that the 
defendant’s testimony will be chilled. Id. In addition, what Bellin calls the “retooled” 
post-Luce version of the factor is, in his view, “essentially meaningless as an analytical 
consideration,” since it involves defendant testimony routinely being found important 
and therefore routinely weighing in favor of permitting prior conviction impeachment. Id 
at 328. For a response to Bellin’s points, see Part IV.A. 
 103 Bellin, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 336 (cited in note 101). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id at 339. 
 106 Id at 336–39: 
Starting on a clean slate unencumbered by the Mahone factors, a trial court, 
evaluating the admissibility of a defendant’s prior convictions as impeachment, 
could focus on the task at hand: identifying the aspects of each conviction and 
the facts of the particular case that could potentially justify the counterintui-
tive conclusion that a prior conviction’s “probative value” as impeachment out-
weighs its “prejudicial effect to the accused.” 
Professor Victor J. Gold has also given up on the usefulness of the “importance of the de-
fendant’s testimony” factor, declaring that consideration of “the need for an accused’s 
testimony should the threat of conviction impeachment deter him from taking the stand” 
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The relationship between the “importance of the defendant’s 
testimony” factor and the “centrality of the credibility issue” fac-
tor has been of particular concern to commentators. Professor 
Roderick Surratt has stated that “[w]hen one [of these two fac-
tors] increases in importance, the other does also, and there ap-
pears to be no principled way to determine which factor should 
prevail.”107 In addition, he argues that both factors can make 
hearings at which the judge decides whether impeachment will 
be permitted “substantially more complex,” since they require 
the conscientious judge to learn “something about the substance 
of the expected testimony.”108 This places a burden on the court, 
since “the hearing is more complex and more time-consuming 
than it otherwise would be,” and on the defendant, who may 
have to give a detailed “preview” of his or her anticipated trial 
testimony.109 Surratt therefore urges the abandonment of both 
the fourth and fifth factors.110 More recently, Professor Ted 
Sampsell-Jones has declared that “[a]t best, the fourth and fifth 
factors are mostly meaningless. At worst, they confuse courts 
and distract from the real issues that should be considered.”111 
4. Lost opportunity even when the factor’s root meaning is 
 preserved. 
To be sure, some federal circuit courts,112 federal district 
courts,113 state courts,114 defense briefs,115 prosecutors,116 and 
 
should “no longer be of consequence.” Charles Alan Wright and Victor J. Gold, 28 Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 6134 at 255 n 77 (Thomson Reuters 2012). 
 107 Surratt, 31 Syracuse L Rev at 945 (cited in note 8). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id at 946. 
 110 Id at 942. 
 111 Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 Minn L Rev 1327, 1362 
(2009). See also id at 1367–69 (proposing that the five-factor test be replaced with a 
“two-sided balancing test” involving the balancing of probative value against prejudice). 
 112 See, for example, Caldwell, 760 F3d at 287–88, quoting McLaughlin, Weinstein, 
and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 609.05[3][e] at 609-43 to -44 (cited in 
note 25) (“[T]he fact that a defendant’s testimony is important to demonstrate the validi-
ty of his or her defense constitutes a factor weighing against the admission of a prior 
conviction.”); Causey, 9 F3d at 1344 (finding that the fact that the defendant “did not ob-
viously need to testify” weighed in favor of the admission of prior conviction); Jackson, 
627 F2d at 1209–10 (finding that the importance of the defendant’s testimony “weigh[ed] 
against admissibility” of a prior conviction). 
 113 See text accompanying notes 118–24. 
 114 See text accompanying notes 125–30. 
 115 See, for example, Reply Brief for Appellant, United States v Brinkley, Docket No 
96-1911, *6 (3d Cir filed Mar 11, 1997) (available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 33581528), 
quoting Gordon, 383 F2d at 939 (“[T]he cause of truth would be helped more by letting 
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commentators117 do adhere to the root meaning of the “importance 
of the defendant’s testimony” factor; in other words, they treat the 
importance of the testimony as a reason to exclude the prior con-
victions. At least some courts within the Second,118 Third,119 Sev-
enth,120 Ninth,121 Tenth,122 Eleventh,123 and DC Circuits124 hew to 
the original sense of this factor. The Oregon Supreme Court has 
noted that “[i]f the testimony of the accused is crucial to a fair de-
termination of the issues . . . then this [importance of the defend-
ant’s testimony] factor tends to favor exclusion.”125 Michigan,126 
Minnesota,127 Mississippi,128 Utah,129 and Vermont130 have taken 
the same approach. And the judge who literally wrote the book 
 
the jury hear the defendant’s story than by the defendant’s foregoing that opportunity 
because of the fear of prejudice.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 116 See, for example, Brief of Appellee, United States v Sindram, Docket No 97-4039, 
*29 (4th Cir filed June 17, 1997) (available on Westlaw at 1997 WL 33492764) (“Sindram 
Government Brief”) (“[A]lthough the defendant’s testimony was important to advance 
the defendant’s claim, the defendant’s testimony also put the issue of his credibility dead 
center in the case.”). 
 117 See text accompanying note 131. 
 118 See, for example, United States v Brown, 606 F Supp 2d 306, 320 (EDNY 2009). 
 119 See, for example, United States v Holmes, 2008 WL 5378276, *2 (WD Pa), citing 
McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 609.05[3][e] at 
609-43 to -44 (cited in note 25) (“As the Defendant’s testimony may be the most crucial 
testimony at trial (should he choose to testify) and possibly the only testimony on behalf 
of his defense, this factor weighs against admission of the prior convictions.”). 
 120 See, for example, Darr, 2007 WL 2700064 at *2; United States v Piker, 2006 WL 
2524130, *2 (CD Ill); United States v Smith, 181 F Supp 2d 904, 910 (ND Ill 2002). 
 121 See, for example, United States v Chant, 1997 WL 231105, *9 (ND Cal). 
 122 See, for example, United States v Reece, 797 F Supp 843, 848 (D Colo 1992). 
 123 See, for example, Brief of Appellant Robert James Collier, United States v Collier, 
Docket No 99-00063, *9–10 (11th Cir filed July 24, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 
WL 34221042). 
 124 See, for example, United States v Coleman, 1991 WL 277334, *1 (DDC). 
 125 McClure, 692 P2d at 585. 
 126 See, for example, People v Snyder, 835 NW2d 608, 611 (Mich App 2013), quoting 
Allen, 420 NW2d at 522 (“Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that prejudice . . . 
escalate[s] with . . . increased importance of the [defendant’s] testimony to the decisional 
process.”) (quotation marks omitted); Snyder, 835 NW2d at 613, quoting Allen, 420 
NW2d at 524 (“[W]ith regard to the importance of the defendant’s testimony to the deci-
sional process, the Allen Court concluded that prejudice increased where, as here, the 
defendant’s testimony was very important to the decisional process, as he had no other 
means of presenting his version of events.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 127 See, for example, State v Gassler, 505 NW2d 62, 67 (Minn 1993). 
 128 See, for example, Bogard v State, 624 S2d 1313, 1317 (Miss 1993); Jordan v 
State, 592 S2d 522, 523 (Miss 1991). 
 129 See, for example, Banner, 717 P2d at 1334–35; State v Martinez, 2001 WL 
311191, *2 (Utah App) (“Finally, the credibility of the witness warranted exclusion as 
defendant’s testimony was of primary import in this case and no decisive nontestimonial 
evidence was presented.”). 
 130 See, for example, State v Gardner, 433 A2d 249, 252 (Vt 1981). 
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on evidence—Judge Jack Weinstein—describes this factor as one 
that, if satisfied, militates in favor of exclusion of the proffered 
conviction: 
A defendant’s decision about whether to testify may be 
based in part on whether prior convictions will be admitted 
for impeachment. Thus, the fact that a defendant’s testimo-
ny is important to demonstrate the validity of his or her de-
fense constitutes a factor weighing against the admission of 
a prior conviction. If, on the other hand, the defense can es-
tablish the subject matter of the defendant’s testimony by 
other means, the defendant’s testimony is less necessary, so 
a prior conviction is more likely to be admitted.131 
Even when these participants in the interpretive process 
adopt the understanding that when the defendant’s testimony is 
important, care should be taken lest it be kept from the fact 
finder, none of them has yet proclaimed the potential usefulness 
of this factor that this Article brings to light. None of them has 
suggested the use of this factor to discuss the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony as a way to combat implicit stereotyp-
ing,132 a topic that is introduced in Part II. 
D. The Consequences for Defendant Testimony and Trial 
Thanks to the distortions mentioned above, as well as other 
doctrinal trends discussed below, the ease with which proffered 
convictions are admitted for impeachment creates consequences 
that are harmful for both defendants and fact finders. 
Admission of prior convictions for impeachment has become 
the default.133 Prosecutors frequently proffer them,134 and judges 
 
 131 McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at 
§ 609.05[3][e] at 609-43 to -44 (cited in note 25) (citations omitted). 
 132 A review of all state and federal briefs available on Westlaw as of November 20, 
2015, revealed that there were no examples of attorneys arguing that the possible dilu-
tion of implicit stereotypes or other implicit biases could constitute part of what makes 
defendant testimony important. 
 133 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 484 (cited in note 1) (“[When] judges are sup-
posed to permit impeachment only if the probative value outweighs the risk of unfairness to 
the accused, the balance is routinely struck in favor of impeachment.”); id at 490–91: 
In every single case in which a defendant with a prior record testified, the trial 
court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant with his or her prior 
convictions. Although some of the prior convictions involved “false statement” 
crimes that were automatically admissible impeachment material, in most cases, 
the trial court made the determination that the probative value of the evidence 
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generally permit them.135 The dispute is typically less about 
whether prior convictions will be admitted and more about how 
many of their details will be admitted.136 
The distortions mentioned above, which prevent the “im-
portance of the defendant’s testimony” factor from providing a 
meaningful check on impeachment by prior conviction, are mir-
rored by other ways in which doctrine has shifted toward the 
admissibility of these convictions. With respect to the third fac-
tor—the “similarity between the past crime and the charged 
crime”137—the case law from which the Mahone test developed 
viewed similarity as something that militated against admissi-
bility,138 because it increased the risk that the conviction would 
be interpreted as relevant to a defendant’s propensity to commit 
that crime, rather than to a defendant’s credibility.139 Some 
courts, however, have interpreted similarity as a reason to favor 
admissibility.140 Similarly, with respect to the fifth factor—the 
 
was not outweighed by prejudice to the accused; this was true even when the 
defendant’s prior conviction was for the same or a very similar offense.  
(citations omitted). See also Kenneth S. Broun, ed, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 42 at 276 
(Thomson Reuters 7th ed 2013) (“Most prosecutors argue forcefully that it is misleading 
to permit the accused to implicitly portray himself as having led a blameless life, and 
this argument has prevailed widely.”); Pettiford, 238 FRD at 42 (referring to “the general 
trend towards admissibility under Rule 609(a)”). 
 134 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 486 (cited in note 1). 
 135 See id at 484. 
 136 FRE 609 itself does not prescribe the type or amount of evidence to be admitted. 
FRE 609(a) (referring only to “evidence of a criminal conviction”). Typically, federal 
courts permit the name of the crime, the date of the crime, and the sentence imposed. 
See, for example, United States v Smith, 454 F3d 707, 716 (7th Cir 2006) (stating that a 
proponent is limited to “identify[ing] the particular felony charged, the date, and the dis-
position of a prior conviction”). 
 137 Mahone, 537 F2d at 929. 
 138 See Ed Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other Name . . . : A Proposal to 
Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction under Rule 609, 58 Geo Wash L Rev 762, 772 
(1990); McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at 
§ 609.05[3][d] at 609-42 (cited in note 25) (“When a prior crime committed by an accused 
criminal defendant is similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, the preju-
dicial effect of a prior conviction admitted for impeachment may well outweigh its proba-
tive value. Consequently, prior convictions for the same or similar crimes are admitted 
sparingly.”). 
 139 See Sampsell-Jones, 2010 Utah L Rev at 734 (cited in note 24) (noting that one of 
the primary modern rationales for character evidence rules is “based on a concern that 
juries will find the defendant guilty of the discrete charged act, but that they will do so 
relying too heavily on the inference that because he did something bad in the past, he 
probably did this as well”). 
 140 See, for example, United States v Wallace, 848 F2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir 1988) 
(finding that the district court’s analysis, which, inter alia, treated similarity as a factor 
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“centrality of the credibility issue”141—some courts have trans-
formed it into a factor that automatically favors the prosecution, 
by concluding that credibility is a central issue in every case in 
which a defendant testifies.142 
The widespread admission of proffered convictions, paired 
with the apparent ineffectiveness of limiting instructions,143 
means that many defendants—even those with stories of inno-
cence to tell—remain silent rather than risk being impeached by 
criminal convictions that might otherwise be kept private.144 
This silence may take the form either of a plea bargain in lieu of 
a trial that appears hopeless, or of a trial in which the defendant 
does not exercise his or her right to testify.145 This problem af-
fects a great many cases, because a large proportion of defend-
ants have prior felony convictions.146 
The silence of criminal defendants has a number of harmful 
consequences.147 Governmental conduct and evidence may go un-
checked.148 Fact finders may assume guilt based on their desire 
 
favoring impeachment, was an abuse of discretion). See also Gainor, Note, 58 Geo Wash 
L Rev at 780–81 & n 112 (cited in note 138). 
 141 Mahone, 537 F2d at 929. 
 142 See Gainor, Note, 58 Geo Wash L Rev at 782–83 & nn 124–25 (cited in note 138). 
See also, for example, United States v Sanders, 2006 WL 3531462, *2 (ED Pa) (stating 
that if the defendant “testifies at trial, his testimony—like that of all defendants who 
make this decidedly serious and fundamental voluntary choice—will be important, and 
his credibility instantly will become a central issue at trial”); United States v Graves, 
2006 WL 1997378, *3 (ED Pa) (“When a defendant testifies, he places his credibility di-
rectly at issue.”) (quotation marks omitted); Jackson, 668 A2d at 20 n 5 (Bell dissenting) 
(“[F]actor (5) almost always will favor the admissibility of the prior convictions.”). 
 143 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 488 & n 44 (cited in note 1). 
 144 One recent study of more than three hundred trials in four large counties revealed 
statistically significant associations between “the defendant’s testifying at trial and the ju-
ry’s learning about the defendant’s prior record.” Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie P. Hans, 
Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Deci-
sion to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 Cornell L Rev 1353, 1357, 1367–69 (2009).  
 145 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 88). 
 146 See Thomas H. Cohen and Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Ur-
ban Counties, 2006 *1–2 (DOJ, July 15, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/E9HK-JCS4 
(finding that of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in the coun-
try, 43 percent had a felony-conviction record in 2006). 
 147 For a more thorough analysis of the prevalence of defendant silence, see general-
ly Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev 1449 (cited in note 88); Sampsell-Jones, 93 Minn L Rev 1327 
(cited in note 111); Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials through 
Legal Rules That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U Cin L Rev 851 (2008). 
 148 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 88) (noting that if defendants 
could speak freely, “[t]he system would [ ] obtain more information about law enforce-
ment and how police behave”); Darryl K. Brown, American Prosecutors’ Powers and Ob-
ligations in the Era of Plea Bargaining, in Erik Luna and Marianne L. Wade, eds, The 
Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective 200, 204 (Oxford 2012) (“[W]hen pleas replace 
 2016] Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony 859 
 
to hear both sides149 and their suspicion—despite instructions to 
the contrary150—that silence implies guilt.151 As one court has put 
it, this silence places a “burden [ ] upon truth-finding”:152 it de-
prives the fact finders of information whose importance has been 
repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court153 and by lower 
court judges.154 The lost testimony may constitute a narrative of 
innocence, as demonstrated by Professor John Blume’s recent 
study of exonerees who sat silently through the trials at which 
they were wrongfully convicted155—the most common reason that 
their attorneys gave for their clients’ silence was their fear of 
 
trials, most of the systemic components of public adjudication that serve the objectives of 
factual reliability and accurate normative judgment are missing—the jury, evidentiary dis-
closure, rules of evidence, formal adversarial challenges to state evidence, and so on.”). 
 149 See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doc-
trine, Images, and Procedures, 64 NC L Rev 501, 518 n 102 (1986), citing David Kairys, Jay 
Schulman, and Sid Harring, eds, The Jury System: New Methods for Reducing Prejudice; 
A Manual for Lawyers, Legal Workers, and Social Scientists 2 (National Jury Project 
1975) (noting studies suggesting that 60 percent of prospective jurors reject the pre-
sumption of innocence); James E. Beaver and Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify 
the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 Temple L Q 585, 609 (1985) (“Jurors 
expect innocent defendants to respond to false criminal accusations. From silence jurors 
draw an inference of guilt. The defendant who appears to withhold relevant information 
is likely to be viewed as guilty.”) (citation omitted). 
 150 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 488 (cited in note 1) (“The jury is likely 
to disregard an instruction that this inference is not permissible.”). 
 151 See Lauren Cusick, Serial’s Big Confession (For the Love of Podcast, Nov 15, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/HJR5-A3NQ (reporting a juror’s answer to the question wheth-
er it bothered the jury that the defendant did not take the stand: “Yes, it did. That was 
huge. Yeah, that was huge. . . . Why not, if you’re a defendant, why would you not get up 
there and defend yourself and try to prove that the State is wrong, that you weren’t there, 
that you’re not guilty?”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense 
Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45 Tex 
Tech L Rev 315, 358 (2012) (citing empirical evidence that “despite the presumption of 
innocence, most jurors believe that those accused of crime are probably guilty, ought to 
testify if they are not, and bear the burden of proving their innocence”). 
 152 Allen, 420 NW2d at 521. 
 153 See, for example, Rock v Arkansas, 483 US 44, 52 (1987) (“[T]he most important 
witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself.”); Ferguson v 
Georgia, 365 US 570, 582 (1961) (noting that the defendant “above all others may be in a 
position to meet the prosecution’s case”); Green v United States, 365 US 301, 304 (1961) 
(“The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant 
might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.”). 
 154 See, for example, United States v Walker, 772 F2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir 1985) 
(“Where the very point of a trial is to determine whether an individual was involved in 
criminal activity, the testimony of the individual himself must be considered of prime 
importance.”); Eisenberg and Hans, 94 Cornell L Rev at 1370 (cited in note 144) (“In the 
cases in which defendants testified, judges reported that, on average, defendant testimo-
ny was more important than that of the police, of informants, of co-defendants, and of 
expert witnesses.”). 
 155 Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 477 (cited in note 1). 
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prior conviction impeachment.156 The lost testimony may also 
help to bridge the considerable gulf of experience between the 
average juror and the average defendant.157 If so, it brings a 
number of advantages: it gets closer to the ideal of a jury of one’s 
peers, it enhances fact-finding, and it increases the ability of the 
juror (and all others in the courtroom who hear the testimony) to 
participate in civic discourse in an informed manner.158 
Thus, the loss of the opportunity contained within the “im-
portance of the defendant’s testimony” factor matters, and the 
broader silencing effect of widespread impeachment matters. 
Part III discusses the possibility that the factor could be revivi-
fied, with the effect of lessening this silencing. First, however, 
Part II introduces a phenomenon that defendant testimony 
might help combat: implicit racial stereotyping in the courtroom. 
II.  IMPLICIT STEREOTYPES THAT THREATEN TO FILL THE 
SILENCE 
Part I laid out the ways in which the “importance of the de-
fendant’s testimony” factor has lost its root meaning, and the si-
lencing of the defendant to which this loss has contributed. It al-
so introduced a variety of harms that result from this silencing. 
This Part elaborates on one of those harms. Part II.A describes 
the implicit racial stereotyping that fills the silence when fact 
finders hear nothing from African American defendants; Part 
II.B explains that this stereotyping has no easy solution. Part 
III then introduces the notion that urging the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony as a possible means of combating this 
kind of stereotyping could bring new and useful life back to the 
“importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor. 
 
 156 Id at 491. 
 157 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1498–99 (cited in note 88) (“[T]he criminal sys-
tem never gets to know defendants—their voices, identities, motivations, or experienc-
es.”); Rob Walters, Michael Marin, and Mark Curriden, Are We Getting a Jury of Our 
Peers?, 68 Tex Bar J 144, 145–46 (2005) (noting the underrepresentation of several de-
mographic groups in the Texas jury system and similar trends in court systems across 
the country). For additional discussion of this gulf, see text accompanying notes 197–202. 
 158 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 88) (“If the system was in-
tended to keep society substantially clueless about the people it incarcerates, it could not 
have been better designed.”). 
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A. Implicit Stereotypes Targeting Criminal Defendants 
One of the dangers of silencing defendant testimony is that 
when defendants remain silent, implicit—or unconscious159—
stereotypes on the part of the fact finders may spring up to fill 
the silence. It does not appear to be the case, in other words, 
that when faced with a defendant who exercises his or her right 
not to testify, jurors reserve judgment and hold fast to the pre-
sumption of innocence while they await the remaining evidence. 
Rather, their minds seethe with premature assumptions that, in 
the absence of defendant testimony, the defense may have little 
chance to dispel. 
Stereotypes can be defined as “well-learned sets of associa-
tions between some trait and a social group,”160 and implicit ste-
reotypes can be defined as unconscious associations between 
particular groups and particular traits.161 Along with implicit at-
titudes, which are unconscious feelings of warmth or hostility 
toward particular groups,162 they fall under the heading of im-
plicit bias,163 which is a type of implicit social cognition.164 Implic-
it bias is entirely compatible with explicit commitments to 
equality.165 Thus, even while explicit expressions of prejudice 
 
 159 The meaning of “implicit” in this context is that “we are either unaware of or 
mistaken about the source of the thought or feeling.” Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer 
for Courts *8 (National Center for State Courts, Aug 2009), archived at 
http://perma.cc/4NUK-BHXN. “Implicit stereotypes are the introspectively unidentified 
(or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of quali-
ties to members of a social category. Generally, we are unaware of our implicit stereo-
types and may not endorse them upon self-reflection.” Id (quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 160 Elizabeth N. Chapman, Anna Kaatz, and Molly Carnes, Physicians and Implicit 
Bias: How Doctors May Unwittingly Perpetuate Health Care Disparities, 28 J Gen Int 
Med 1504, 1504 (2013). 
 161 See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Ju-
ror Bias, 44 Conn L Rev 827, 833 (2012) (“‘Implicit biases’ are discriminatory biases based 
on either implicit attitudes—feelings that one has about a particular group—or implicit 
stereotypes—traits that one associates with a particular group. They are so subtle that 
those who hold them may not realize that they do.”) (emphasis and citation omitted). 
 162 See Kang, Implicit Bias at *8 (cited in note 159) (“Implicit attitudes are intro-
spectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate 
favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects. Generally, we 
are unaware of our implicit attitudes and may not endorse them upon self-reflection.”) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 163 See Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 833 (cited in note 161). 
 164 See Kang, Implicit Bias at *1–2 (cited in note 159). 
 165 See Sophie Lebrecht, et al, Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Ra-
cial Bias, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2009) (“Critically, this sort of implicit [racial] bias does not 
correlate with explicit judgments of race—what we say we believe.”); Russell H. Fazio 
and Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning 
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have generally declined,166 implicit bias has been shown both to 
exist in a large proportion of the population167 (and in people 
from all walks of life168) and to involve negative attitudes and 
stereotypes that are based on ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, 
religion, political affiliation, and numerous other categories.169 
Both jurors and judges appear to be as susceptible to implic-
it bias as others are. As Professor Jerry Kang and his coauthors 
put it, the assumption made as to jurors is one of “unexception-
alism”:170 there is no reason why they should be any different 
from the rest of the population, which exhibits significant levels 
of implicit bias.171 This assumption is supported by findings of 
implicit bias among mock jurors172 and among real trial judges.173 
Nor is it easy to detect or weed out those fact finders who are 
most affected by implicit bias. Since implicit biases are not easi-
ly accessible to the conscious mind, voir dire is unequal to the 
task of identifying those potential jurors who harbor particularly 
high levels of implicit bias.174 In addition, trial judges may have 
 
and Use, 54 Ann Rev Psychology 297, 303 (2003) (“Within the domain of prejudice and ste-
reotypes, the correlations [between implicit and explicit measures] tend to be quite low.”). 
 166 See Mary E. Wheeler and Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-
Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 Psychological Sci 56, 57 (2005). 
 167 See Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 850 n 170 (cited in note 161). 
 168 See id at 834. 
 169 See id at 848–49. 
 170 Jerry Kang, et al, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L Rev 1124, 1144 
(2012) (“Our default assumption is juror unexceptionalism—given that implicit biases 
generally influence decisionmaking, there is no reason to presume that citizens become 
immune to the effects of these biases when they serve in the role of jurors.”). 
 171 See John Tyler Clemons, Note, Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Ra-
cial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 51 Am Crim L Rev 
689, 698–99 (2014):  
Research has demonstrated that jurors drawn from the general population do 
not shed their implicit racial bias at the doors of the courtroom. Specifically, 
research has repeatedly shown that . . . jurors treat members of “outgroups,” 
such as those of a different race, more harshly than those jurors perceive to be 
substantially like them. Because the majority of juries continue to be all or 
predominantly white, such outgroup bias disproportionately disadvantages 
minority defendants. 
(citations omitted).  
 172 See Kang, et al, 59 UCLA L Rev at 1142–43 (cited in note 170), citing Tara L. 
Mitchell, et al, Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-analytic Review of 
Defendant Treatment, 29 L & Hum Behav 621, 627–28 (2005). 
 173 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judg-
es?, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 1195, 1225 (2009) (“[I]mplicit biases are widespread among 
judges.”).  
 174 See Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 Conn L 
Rev 1023, 1030 (2008), quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On 
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an inflated sense of their own fairness and therefore may be par-
ticularly ill-suited to the task of detecting their own implicit bi-
ases.175 Finally, aspects of the courtroom setting may enhance 
the influence of implicit bias.176 
As described in this Section, implicit stereotypes are of par-
ticular concern in the context of fact-finding at trial—especially 
in a criminal trial. First, they permit prejudgment of a case, or 
certain aspects of a case, thus potentially threatening the pre-
sumption of innocence.177 Second, they take the most troubling 
form—that is, they are the most threatening to the presumption 
of innocence—when targeted against a population that is al-
ready overrepresented in the criminal-justice system, namely, 
people of color (and, in particular, African Americans).178 Third, 
implicit biases such as these can affect the very tasks that we 
call on fact finders to perform.179 Finally, implicit bias may have 
contributed to racial disparities in conviction rates, and the fear 
 
Race, Privacy, and Community (a Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism 
and Democracy), 114 Yale L J 1353, 1391 (2005): 
[T]he harsh reality for judges conducting voir dire aimed at seating only fair 
and impartial jurors is that the jurors themselves may not be able to assist be-
cause, as Professor Lawrence has said, “we restrict our own speech because we 
cannot bear admitting our own racism.” If true, how can judges posing such 
questions, as I have, expect to get valid responses, particularly where an hon-
est response about one’s operative biases requires conscious insight into one’s 
unconscious? 
(citation omitted). 
 175 See Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1225–26 (cited in note 173) (“[W]e 
asked a group of judges . . . to rate their ability to ‘avoid racial prejudice in decision-
making’ relative to other judges. . . . Ninety-seven percent (thirty-five out of thirty-six) of 
the judges placed themselves in the top half and fifty percent (eighteen out of thirty-six) 
placed themselves in the top quartile.”). 
 176 See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmak-
ing, and Misremembering, 57 Duke L J 345, 380–81 (2007) (noting that judges and juries 
may be particularly prone to “stereotype-consistent memory errors” due to “cognitive de-
pletion,” causing them to remember facts through a racially biased filter); Justin D. 
Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How “Legal Prim-
ing” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U Cin L Rev 1059, 1068–69 (2005) 
(describing how jury members are primed by the cultural norms of the legal system); id 
at 1073–74 (suggesting that jurors may be influenced by other jurors’ stereotypes, be-
liefs, and majoritarian thinking). 
 177 See Patricia G. Devine and Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stere-
otyping and Prejudice, in Todd D. Nelson, ed, Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and 
Discrimination 61, 61 (Psychology 2009) (“[T]he research literature is replete with evi-
dence that stereotypes often result in biased judgments of and behaviors toward targets 
of stereotypes.”). 
 178 See text accompanying notes 181–202. 
 179 See text accompanying notes 203–10. 
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of implicit bias at trial may be contributing to the astonishingly 
high rate at which cases are resolved by plea bargains.180 
The implicit stereotypes that have been shown to be common-
ly associated with African Americans are ugly.181 When, as is of-
ten the case, these stereotypes threaten to cause fact finders to 
prejudge an entire criminal case, or even just part of a criminal 
case, they are not just ugly but deeply challenging to the ideal of a 
fair trial.182 Research suggests the existence of implicit stereo-
types connecting African Americans with violence,183 weaponry,184 
hostility,185 aggression,186 and immorality.187 These findings 
 
 180 See text accompanying notes 211–12. Roughly 95 percent of felony convictions in 
the seventy-five largest counties are the result of guilty pleas. Cohen and Kyckelhahn, 
Felony Defendants at *1 (cited in note 146). See also Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Un-
just: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist Assumptions, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 
999, 1007 (2013):  
[E]ven where people of color exercise their right to go to trial, there is a greater 
chance that the fact-finder—whether a jury or a judge—will interpret the facts in 
a manner consistent with guilt because of the defendant’s skin color. Therefore, 
defendants of color are more likely to plead guilty and to be found guilty at trial 
due to forces independent of their own culpability or the merits of the case.  
(citation omitted). 
 181 See notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 182 The presumption of innocence “is a basic component of a fair trial under our sys-
tem of criminal justice.” Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 (1976). 
 183  See Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 322 (MIT 1999) (“Sub-
liminal exposure to the word Black can prime negative aspects of the African American ste-
reotype such as poor, lazy, and violent in the minds [of] non–African Americans.”). 
 184 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, et al, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Pro-
cessing, 87 J Personality & Soc Psychology 876, 881 (2004) (noting that participants who 
saw a black face were quicker to identify “crime-relevant objects” than those who saw a 
white face). 
 185 See Jerry Kang and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 Cal L Rev 1063, 1085 n 113 (2006) (noting that 
shoves and bumps are far more likely to be interpreted as aggressive or hostile when 
committed by African Americans than when committed by Caucasians); Ziva Kunda and 
Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, Traits, and Behaviors: A Parallel-
Constraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103 Psychological Rev 284, 290 (1996). 
 186 See Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith, and Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death: 
An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty 
States, 89 NYU L Rev 513, 563–64 (2014) (reporting that a sample of jury-eligible citizens 
displayed moderate to strong implicit racial stereotypes of black Americans, including ag-
gression); Kang and Banaji, 94 Cal L Rev at 1085 n 113 (cited in note 185); Kunda, Social 
Cognition at 347 (cited in note 183) (“[E]xposure to an African American individual may 
spontaneously bring to mind traits such as aggressive or criminal which then influence the 
interpretation of ambiguous behaviors. A disturbing aspect of this process is that perceiv-
ers, from their own perspective, may not realize that they are being prejudiced.”) (citation 
omitted).  
 187 See Paul F. Secord, William Bevan, and Brenda Katz, The Negro Stereotype and 
Perceptual Accentuation, 53 J Abnormal Psychology 78, 79 (1956) (reporting the results 
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threaten the notion of fair fact-finding not only in cases involving 
allegations of violence but also, given implicit and explicit associ-
ations between violence and drugs,188 in the very large number of 
cases that involve drug allegations.189 They may also threaten the 
notion of fair fact-finding in any case in which concerns about the 
safety implications of a not guilty verdict influence a fact finder’s 
decision.190 More broadly, researchers have demonstrated the 
presence of implicit stereotypes linking African Americans to 
criminal guilt.191 These findings have devastating implications 
for the fairness of all types of criminal cases, assuming that 
these stereotypes are not dispelled. 
The implicit stereotypes targeted at African Americans are 
particularly troubling because they threaten to compound exist-
ing racial disparities within the criminal-justice system. It is of 
course no coincidence that the population whose rate of criminali-
zation is most grossly inflated—African Americans192—is also the 
population against whom the implicit stereotypes most threaten-
ing to the presumption of innocence are directed. The same his-
torical and contemporary disparities underlie both phenomena.193 
But compounded injustices result: First, as commentators have 
noted, merely existing as an African American may mean being 
 
of a study in which African Americans portrayed in photographs were viewed as more 
immoral than Caucasians portrayed in similar photographs). 
 188 See, for example, Ingram v City of Columbus, 185 F3d 579, 588 n 7 (6th Cir 1999). 
 189 See Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose, and Donald Farole Jr, Felony Sentences 
in State Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables *3 (DOJ, Nov 22, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/XQM5-3PVT (indicating that 33.4 percent of convictions in state courts in 
2006 were for drug offenses). 
 190 See Sampsell-Jones, 2010 Utah L Rev at 734 (cited in note 24) (discussing con-
cerns about juries engaging in “preventive detention”). 
 191 See Eberhardt, et al, 87 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 889–91 (cited in note 
184) (discussing multiple experiments finding a strong “association between blackness 
and criminality”); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Danielle Young, Guilty by Im-
plicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 Ohio St J Crim L 
187, 190, 207–08 (2010) (demonstrating that mock jurors “held strong associations be-
tween Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and [that] these implicit associa-
tions predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”). 
 192 See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the 
Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 Stan L & Pol Rev 355, 361 (2011) (“African Americans 
are 12.7% of the general population, but are 41.3% of the federal and state prison popu-
lation.”); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Note, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting 
Lending Discrimination against Ex-Offenders, 80 NYU L Rev 1237, 1258–59 (2005) 
(“[P]eople of color—especially African-Americans—are disproportionately arrested and 
convicted.”). 
 193 See, for example, Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 370–72 (1987) (discussing the 
historical framework of the relationship between black communities and the police).  
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deprived of the protection of the layperson’s presumption of inno-
cence and instead being viewed as if on some kind of probation.194 
In other words, assumptions of guilt may well have led to the 
courtroom presence of a disproportionate number of people of col-
or.195 Second, layered on that disparity is a phenomenon that oc-
curs once inside the courtroom: the implicit stereotypes of the fact 
finders threaten the courtroom presumption of innocence.196 Third, 
while criminal defendants are disproportionately people of color,197 
juries and judges are disproportionately white,198 and a great deal 
of implicit bias involves bias against “out-groups”199—that is, 
groups that are not one’s own.200 Thus the common defendant–fact 
finder pairing of black–white creates particularly fertile ground 
 
 194 See Tracy Jan, Q&A: Charles Ogletree on Gates’ Arrest, One Year Later (Boston 
Globe, June 30, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/J8EG-W9PF; Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, 
Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 Minn L 
Rev 367, 413 (1996), quoting Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class 72 (HarperCollins 
1993) (mentioning the “oft-unstated assumption that blacks are still on probation—that 
. . . blacks are not necessarily granted a presumption of innocence, competence, or even 
complete humanity”). 
 195 See Naomi Murakawa and Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: 
The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 L & Socy Rev 695, 
701 (2010) (“[R]acial power is not the sole province of white bigots to which people of col-
or are subject, but rather a systemic and institutional phenomenon that reproduces ra-
cial inequality and the presumption of black and brown criminality.”). 
 196 See text accompanying notes 203–10. 
 197 Smith, 10 Ohio St J Crim L at 287 (cited in note 11).  
 198 For the racial composition of juries, see William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner, 
and Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U Pa J Const L 171, 190–91 & n 99 
(2001) (noting that approximately 25 percent of juries in a sample of death penalty cases 
had no black members and nearly 70 percent had two or fewer). For the racial composi-
tion of the judiciary, see Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and 
the Limits of Perception, 47 Akron L Rev 693, 702 (2014) (“As of 2010, federal judges 
were . . . more than 80 percent white. . . . In state high courts, 87 percent of judges are 
white. In state trial courts, 86 percent of judges are white.”). 
 199 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
Cornell L Rev 934, 951 (1984) (“[W]hen the evidence is sparse, jurors are more likely to 
attribute guilt to defendants of a different race. Jurors are also more likely to convict 
when the victim is of their own race.”) (citation omitted); Kunda, Social Cognition at 348 
(cited in note 183) (“The same negative act may be attributed less to the actor’s underly-
ing personality and more to situational forces when the actor belongs to one’s own group 
than to an out-group.”). 
 200 See Lebrecht, et al, 4 PLOS ONE at 1 (cited in note 165) (“People show a nega-
tive implicit association with members of a racial group other than their own.”); Samuel 
R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and 
Dispositional Attributions, 26 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull 1367, 1368 (2000). 
 2016] Reclaiming the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony 867 
 
for the operation of implicit stereotypes201 and forms a third lay-
er of unfairness.202 
Implicit biases are not harmless mental quirks. Rather, they 
affect the key tasks that we rely on fact finders to perform: eval-
uation of evidence;203 recall of facts;204 and the forming of deci-
sions and judgments,205 including judgments of guilt.206 In addi-
tion, stereotypes can affect whether one can envision an 
individual (such as a defendant) engaging in certain behavior.207 
 
 201 See Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1222 (cited in note 173) (“Jurors 
are drawn from randomly selected adults, and a majority of white jurors will harbor im-
plicit white preferences.”). 
 202 This is not intended as a complete accounting of the multiple layers of racial un-
fairness at play in contemporary America. 
 203 See Levinson, Cai, and Young, 8 Ohio St J Crim L at 190, 207 (cited in note 191); 
Justin D. Levinson and Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit 
Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W Va L Rev 307, 309–10 (2010) 
(“[E]ven the simplest of racial cues introduced into a trial might automatically and unin-
tentionally evoke racial stereotypes, thus affecting the way jurors evaluate evidence.”). 
 204 See Bertram Gawronski, et al, It’s in the Mind of the Beholder: The Impact of 
Stereotypic Associations on Category-Based and Individuating Impression Formation, 39 
J Experimental Soc Psychology 16, 17, 22–23, 26–27 (2003) (finding that, in a study con-
cerning the strength of association between “gender” and “career” versus “household,” 
implicit-association test scores related to memory performance); Levinson, 57 Duke L J 
at 398–401 (cited in note 176) (finding that mock jurors remembered aggression-related 
case facts more accurately when faced with an aggressive black actor than when faced 
with an aggressive white actor, and that mock jurors sometimes developed false memo-
ries of nonexistent facts when those facts were consistent with stereotypes of black men). 
 205 See Fazio and Olson, 54 Ann Rev Psychology at 305 (cited in note 165) (“[B]oth 
implicit and explicit measures can be predictive of judgments and behavior.”); Eugene 
Borgida, Laurie A. Rudman, and Laurie L. Manteufel, On the Courtroom Use and Misuse 
of Gender Stereotyping Research, 51 J Soc Issues 181, 184 (1995) (noting that “the evi-
dence is compelling that gender stereotypes influence social judgments”); Kang, Implicit 
Bias at *4 (cited in note 159) (“[I]mplicit bias predicts how we read the friendliness of 
facial expressions . . . [and] predicts more negative evaluations of ambiguous actions by 
an African American, which could influence decisionmaking in hard cases.”) (citation 
omitted); Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1225 (cited in note 173) (“First, im-
plicit biases are widespread among judges. Second, these biases can influence their 
judgment.”). 
 206 See Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DePaul L 
Rev 599, 600–01 (2009) (noting that many Americans have biases that manifest them-
selves when they “categorize information, remember facts, and make decisions”) (cita-
tions omitted); Levinson, Smith, and Young, 89 NYU L Rev at 521 (cited in note 186) 
(finding that the higher the levels of implicit racial bias in mock jurors, “the more likely 
they were to convict a Black defendant relative to a White defendant”); Levinson and 
Young, 112 W Va L Rev at 337 (cited in note 203) (discussing the tendency of mock jurors 
to find ambiguous facts about a black suspect more indicative of guilt than similar facts 
about a lighter-skinned suspect, and confirming that “participants’ evidence judgments 
also predicted their guilty/not guilty verdicts”). 
 207 Ziva Kunda and Bonnie Sherman-Williams, Stereotypes and the Construal of In-
dividuating Information, 19 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull 90, 97 (1993) (noting that 
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Even if it is established that a stereotyped individual did engage 
in a particular act, stereotypes “may affect [the act’s] perceived 
meaning, antecedents, and causal determinants.”208 Thus, studies 
have indicated that participants are more likely to view an indi-
vidual’s behavior as caused by his or her internal disposition (as 
opposed to being caused by external factors) when the behavior is 
consistent with a stereotype.209 Weak academic credentials, for ex-
ample, seem to be attributed more to a lack of ability when an Af-
rican American person is being assessed than when a Caucasian 
person is.210 
Given the impact of implicit bias on all of the key functions 
of fact finders—including the ultimate function of resolving a 
case—it is unsurprising that commentators have pointed to im-
plicit bias as a possible factor contributing to disparities in con-
viction rates.211 Nor is it only conviction rates at trial that are 
implicated. The predominant method of criminal-case resolu-
tion—the plea—occurs in the shadow of the trial, and it appears 
that the threat of implicit fact finder bias at trial helps to main-
tain the plea’s predominance.212 
 
stereotypes can lead people to “envision [ ] different targets as engaging in different 
behaviors”). 
 208 Id (giving the example of test failure, which, thanks to ethnic stereotypes, may 
be attributed to laziness in the case of an Asian individual or to low ability in the case of 
a black individual). See also Margo J. Monteith, Jeffrey W. Sherman, and Patricia G. 
Devine, Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 Personality & Soc Psychology 
Rev 63, 64 (1998) (“Stereotypes often exert undue influence on evaluations, judgments, 
and behaviors. For example, ambiguous behaviors are likely to be interpreted in stereo-
typic ways.”) (citation omitted); Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 19 Personality & Soc 
Psychology Bull at 97 (cited in note 207) (noting that stereotypes influence the “perceived 
meaning of the act to the actor”).  
 209 See Kunda and Thagard, 103 Psychological Rev at 295 (cited in note 185). 
 210 See id. 
 211 See Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and 
Support for Punitive Policies *15 (The Sentencing Project, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/UB68-WHCB (“[S]tudies of mock jurors have found that a defendant’s 
race has some impact on verdicts and sentencing.”); Levinson, Smith, and Young, 89 
NYU L Rev at 563–65 (cited in note 186) (suggesting that implicit bias among capital 
juries could be responsible for disparities in capital conviction rates). 
 212 See Andrew Cohen, Confessing While Black: When the Threat of a White Jury Is 
an Interrogation Tool (The Marshall Project, Dec 12, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/M7S4-SFCH (exposing the extent to which suspects are pressured into 
making a “confession” because of the fear that they will not be given a fair jury); Otis B. 
Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of Jury Nul-
lification, 14 Geo Mason U CR L J 145, 175 (2004) (noting that in most criminal cases, 
“the defendant evaluates the information and pleads guilty” and that “[f]or blacks this 
information includes the racial makeup of the jury, which is usually predominantly white, 
and the fact that members of the jury will almost assuredly react negatively upon the ste-
reotype of the dreaded ‘black male criminal’”) (citation omitted); id at 166–67 (noting that, 
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B. Efforts to Remedy Courtroom Fairness 
This Section lays out the ways in which—despite interest in 
addressing implicit stereotypes in the courtroom and despite the 
launch of several initiatives having that aim—severe obstacles 
stand in the way of progress, including hesitation about creating 
new structures. There is nothing approaching a panacea; rather, 
multifaceted efforts, including those that work within existing 
structures, are required. 
The research findings that indicate the existence of implicit 
bias—including implicit fact finder bias—have moved judges, 
judicial administrators, scholars, and others to look for ways in 
which its threat might be lessened.213 Judicial education has in-
corporated aspects of implicit-bias research,214 and various task 
forces have been formed to develop additional reform pro-
posals.215 Judge Mark Bennett has been a noteworthy pioneer, 
introducing a raft of reforms into his courtroom, including a dis-
cussion of implicit bias in voir dire, jury instructions on the top-
ic, and a pledge that all jurors must sign, affirming that they 
will not decide the case based on biases.216 Another federal judge, 
 
in large part because of negative black stereotypes, “many African-American defendants 
know that the public often considers them guilty even though they may not have com-
mitted a crime” and that “[c]onsequently, many choose to plea[d] to a lesser offense ra-
ther than face a jury that is often overwhelmingly white and hostile”). 
 213 See, for example, Pamela M. Casey, et al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: 
Resources for Education *i, 2 (National Center for State Courts, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/EBZ2-HBLA (describing the results of the two-phase National Campaign 
to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s State Courts, launched in 2006, 
the second phase of which focused on implicit bias, including “the development and de-
livery of judicial education programs on implicit bias in three states”). 
 214 See id. The National Judicial College’s model curriculum also has introductory 
course materials that are “designed to experientially bring to the consciousness of at-
tendees how their thoughts and actions are based on their culture and background.” 
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal 
Sentencing, 57 Drake L Rev 591, 630–31 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).  
 215 The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section has assembled a task 
force to develop jury instructions addressing implicit bias. See Jennifer K. Elek and Paula 
Hannaford-Agor, Can Explicit Instructions Reduce Expressions of Implicit Bias? New 
Questions following a Test of a Specialized Jury Instruction *6 n 1 (National Center for 
State Courts, Apr 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZZD4-XD73. See also generally Im-
plicit Bias Initiative (ABA), archived at http://perma.cc/YRG3-DJSJ. The National Cen-
ter for State Courts has also compiled a collection of court studies with the aim of educat-
ing judges and court administrators about implicit biases. See Gender and Racial 
Fairness: Resource Guide (National Center for State Courts), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X83C-U2V6. 
 216 See Kang, et al, 59 UCLA L Rev at 1181–83 (cited in note 170) (“I pledge . . . 
[that] I will not decide this case based on biases. This includes gut feelings, prejudices, 
stereotypes, personal likes or dislikes, sympathies or generalizations.”). 
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Judge Janet Bond Arterton, has described her attempts to ad-
dress racial bias during voir dire, having concluded that if African 
American defendants do not testify, the jurors will “have no 
firsthand measure of the men on trial beyond their appearanc-
es.”217 At the state court level, one judge in North Carolina—
Judge Louis Trosch Jr—has developed a practice of scheduling 
difficult hearings for early in the morning, because of research 
suggesting that stress and a lack of time can increase cognitive 
errors such as implicit bias.218 Judge Milton Souter, in Alaska, 
agreed to give jurors an instruction, proffered by the defense and 
based on implicit-bias scholarship, which asked the jurors to at-
tempt a technique called “race switching” before finalizing their 
verdict.219 Race switching aims to raise awareness of implicit 
stereotyping and involves mentally switching the races of the 
parties to probe whether a change in race might lead to a change 
in verdict.220 In the case in question, that meant taking the races 
of the parties—an African American man was claiming self-
defense in response to an allegation that he assaulted a white 
man with a hammer—and switching them, to see whether one’s 
intended verdict would remain unchanged.221 
These kinds of efforts face huge obstacles. First, implicit bi-
as is a deep-rooted and complex problem,222 to which quick fixes 
will always be inapposite. The kinds of racial disparities that 
 
 217 Arterton, 40 Conn L Rev at 1029 (cited in note 174). See also id:  
I fashioned voir dire questions that emphasized the importance of a trial free 
from any racial bias of any form. I asked the jurors to seriously consider the 
question of whether they could really carry out their duty to be entirely fair 
and impartial to these black defendants or whether they had any inkling of 
doubt about their ability to be racially fair and unbiased. 
 218 See wlulaw, Implicit Bias: MLK Day Speaker Judge Louis A. Trosch ’88 1:23:07–
1:23:51 (Jan 22, 2013), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xTXnkqQ 
-OQ#t=1h23m07s (visited Nov 9, 2015) (Perma archive unavailable) (showing Trosch 
discussing his efforts to address implicit racial bias). 
 219 See James McComas and Cynthia Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial Stereo-
typing in Criminal Cases, 23 Champion 22, 24 (Aug 1999) (stating that Souter, in that 
case, in agreeing to give the instruction, noted that “he personally engaged in a race-
switching exercise whenever he was called upon to impose a sentence on a member of a 
minority race, to insure that he was not being influenced by racial stereotypes”). For the 
model jury instruction that inspired the defense’s proposal, see Lee, 81 Minn L Rev at 
482 (cited in note 194). 
 220 See Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the 
Criminal Courtroom 258 (NYU 2003). 
 221 See id at 256–58. The defendant in this case was acquitted. Id at 258. 
 222 See Casey, et al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias at *B-2 to -3 (cited in note 
213) (discussing sources of implicit bias that include developmental history, affective ex-
perience, culture, and the self). 
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contribute to implicit racial stereotyping are centuries old.223 In-
dications of implicit bias have been detected in children as 
young as six years old,224 and this bias is reinforced in a wide-
spread and daily fashion.225 In addition, stereotypes may be hard 
to abandon if they help to justify an unequal distribution of re-
sources226 or, indeed, an unequal application of the criminal 
 
 223 Erik Olin Wright and Joel Rogers, American Society: How It Really Works 316–30 
(W.W. Norton 2d ed 2015) (citing genocide and geographic displacement, slavery, second-
class citizenship, noncitizen labor, and diffuse racial discrimination as forms of racial 
oppression that have occurred in America and that help illuminate modern racial ine-
quality in America). 
 224 Casey, et al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias at *B-2 (cited in note 213). See 
also Devine and Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and Prejudice at 62 
(cited in note 177) (mentioning a suggestion in the literature that “during socialization, a 
culture’s beliefs about various social groups are frequently activated and become well 
learned” and that, as a result, “these deep-rooted stereotypes and evaluative biases are 
automatically activated, without conscious awareness or intention, in the presence of 
members of stereotyped groups (or their symbolic equivalent) and can consequently in-
fluence social thought and behavior”); Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 2 Personality & 
Soc Psychology Rev at 64 (cited in note 208) (“The explicit and implicit teachings of social 
agents such as parents, peers, or the media ensure that stereotypes will be transmitted 
to children at a young age, before they have had opportunities to develop their own per-
sonal beliefs based on their own personal experiences.”). 
 225 See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not 
Yet Post-racial Society, 91 NC L Rev 1555, 1560–61 (2013) (“Americans are constantly ex-
posed to negative stereotypes about Blacks. These stereotypes include the idea that 
Blacks are lazy people who would rather live on or cheat welfare than work and that 
Blacks are often involved in criminal activity.”) (citation omitted); id at 1561 n 33 (“The 
media frequently depicts young Black and Brown men as the ones who are mugging oth-
er people, scamming people, burglarizing homes, selling drugs, and engaging in drive-by 
shootings.”); Robert J. Smith and Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias 
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 Seattle U L Rev 795, 823 (2012) (“The associ-
ations that are triggered when people view a person of a particular race are likely the 
product of extensive cultural and social learning.”); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the 
Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 Harv CR–CL L Rev 
1, 26 (2011) (“[P]olice profiling . . . adds legitimacy to private discrimination.”); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Po-
licing, 89 J Crim L & Crimin 775, 810 (1999) (“[R]ace-based policing tells the community 
that Blacks are presumed to be lawless and are entitled to fewer liberties.”). A coalition 
of more than fifteen organizations committed to ending racism “within our lifetime,” includ-
ing Everyday Democracy and the Southern Poverty Law Center, has included a list of 
methods to tackle implicit bias on its website. Given the size of the problem, however, it 
seems a long life would be needed to accomplish this goal. See To Uproot the Racial Hierar-
chy Now (TURHN): A Campaign of the Within Our Lifetime Network to Combat the Impact 
of Implicit Bias (Within Our Lifetime), archived at http://perma.cc/VR6U-CWQ2. 
 226 See Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 2 Personality & Soc Psychology Rev at 64 
(cited in note 208) (“The unequal distribution of resources can be twisted into a picture of 
fairness by applying negative stereotypes to disadvantaged groups that serve to justify 
the inequality.”). 
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laws.227 Second, even judges or court administrators who are ea-
ger to address implicit stereotypes may fear that attempting any 
sort of solution would make things worse. This is the reason giv-
en by Bennett for the failure of his colleagues to adopt his inno-
vations.228 These fears may be bolstered by strands of case law 
that suggest that bias should not be discussed in the courtroom, 
lest discussion draw attention to it in ways that are unhelpful.229 
These fears also receive some support from research finding 
that, if handled inappropriately, bias-reduction efforts can back-
fire.230 Third, in a time of fiscal straitening, the effects of which 
have been evident in the court system as elsewhere, innovations 
that are anything other than resource neutral are particularly 
hard to sell.231 Finally, judicial innovators are not yet able to 
 
 227 See Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Ap-
plication of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 395, 408 
(2009), quoting David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Con-
temporary Society 178–79 (Chicago 2001) (“[T]he offender is rendered more and more 
abstract, more and more stereotypical, more and more a projected image rather than an 
individuated person.”).  
 228 See Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 859 (cited in note 161). 
 229 Some courts have barred attorneys from discussing their concerns about bias 
with the juries in their cases. See, for example, Daniels v Burke, 83 F3d 760, 766 (6th Cir 
1996) (upholding the denial of voir dire questioning related to racial bias); Stanton v As-
tra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc, 718 F2d 553, 578–79 (3d Cir 1983) (criticizing an at-
torney for saying to the jury that he was “concerned about the effect of having black peo-
ple come to an area where there are not many black people and expecting to get justice 
from a jury which is mostly white people”). See also Deborah L. Forman, What Difference 
Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA Women’s L J 35, 70 (1992) (“Many 
judges refuse to allow probing into sensitive areas that are inevitably the most crucial to 
the case, such as racism or sexism.”). 
 230 See, for example, Katja Corcoran, Tanja Hundhammer, and Thomas Mussweiler, 
A Tool for Thought! When Comparative Thinking Reduces Stereotyping Effects, 45 J Ex-
perimental Soc Psychology 1008, 1008 (2009) (“[S]ocial perceivers who try to suppress a 
stereotype may later be troubled by rebound-effects that make stereotypic content even 
more accessible and consequently influence their judgment and behavior in subsequent 
tasks.”); Thomas E. Nelson, Michele Acker, and Melvin Manis, Irrepressible Stereotypes, 
32 J Experimental Soc Psychology 13, 31 (1996) (“Conscious attempts at thought regula-
tion may [ ] backfire, leading to exaggerated stereotyping under conditions of diminished 
capacity, or when self-regulation efforts are relaxed.”). 
 231 See Jennifer K. Elek and Paula Hannaford-Agor, First, Do No Harm: On Ad-
dressing the Problem of Implicit Bias in Juror Decision Making, 49 Ct Rev 190, 195 
(2013) (discussing proposals to address implicit juror bias, including administration of 
the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to jurors and the addition of race-relevant voir dire 
questioning, and concluding that the “[c]osts associated with these techniques”—
including the “printing and processing of questionnaires at a time when states are facing 
new and significant budgetary challenges” as well as the “limited existing court re-
sources (e.g., computer access for potential jurors to take the IAT, or trained staff to code 
and process a paper-and-pencil version of the test)”—will “preclude these options from 
consideration in many jurisdictions”). 
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point their hesitant colleagues to empirical work that validates 
their efforts. Indeed, the first published study to investigate the 
effects of jury instructions like those used by Bennett failed to 
demonstrate any significant influence of the instructions on ju-
rors’ verdict preferences.232 
Thus, there exists a desire to alleviate the threats to fair-
ness that implicit bias presents in the courtroom, but no pana-
cea. Those who wish to ameliorate this problem need to channel 
their energy in multiple and creative directions233 and must pay 
particular attention to those methods that require no new struc-
tures and no additional resources. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY AS A 
WAY TO COMBAT IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING 
This Part brings together Part I’s analysis of the lost oppor-
tunity within the impeachment context and Part II’s description 
of the threat to the presumption of innocence created by implicit 
racial stereotyping. It does so by suggesting that one of the un-
fortunate consequences of the phenomenon described in Part I is 
the lack of a forum for arguments that the defendant’s testimony 
is important because it has the potential to combat the implicit 
stereotyping threatening the right to a fair trial. This Part 
draws on a concept from the field of social cognition—
individuation—to suggest that defendant testimony might fur-
ther this goal as part of a multipart strategy to combat implicit 
stereotyping in the courtroom. 
Part III.A introduces individuation as a method of combat-
ing implicit stereotyping. Part III.B explores the aspects of 
 
 232 See Elek and Hannaford-Agor, Can Explicit Instructions Reduce Expressions of 
Implicit Bias? at *8, 14 (cited in note 215) (finding “no significant effects . . . on judg-
ments of guilt, confidence, strength of the prosecution’s evidence, or sentence length” 
when testing a specialized implicit-bias jury instruction “[b]ased loosely on [the] jury in-
struction developed and used by Judge Mark Bennett”). 
 233 For endorsements of these kinds of multipronged strategies, see, for example, 
Lee, 91 NC L Rev at 1590–1601 (cited in note 225) (providing a variety of suggestions as 
to how prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys can attempt to combat implicit bias 
by making race salient); Patricia G. Devine, et al, Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race 
Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J Experimental Soc Psychology 1267, 
1276 (2012) (describing “compelling and encouraging evidence for the effectiveness of our 
multifaceted intervention in promoting enduring reductions in implicit bias”); id at 1277 
(noting that it is “likely that there is no single ‘magic bullet’ that, by itself, prompts the 
regulation of implicit bias and the multifarious changes in concern and awareness such 
self-regulation brings,” and that “[i]nstead, several components likely work in combina-
tion to prompt situational awareness of one’s bias and translate that awareness into 
chronic awareness, concern, and self-regulatory effort”). 
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individuation research that make this concept particularly ap-
plicable to defendant testimony. Part III.C conducts that appli-
cation, laying out the ways in which arguments about individua-
tion might be made under a revivified “importance of the 
defendant’s testimony” heading and the advantages that such an 
approach might bring. 
A. Introduction to Individuation as a Method of Combating 
Bias 
Two main categories of information shape one’s impressions 
of an individual.234 The first is stereotypes—associations between 
particular groups and particular traits.235 The second is individu-
ating information, which encompasses everything else—details 
about an individual’s acts, for example, or personality, or life cir-
cumstances.236 It is all too easy for stereotypes to dominate the 
process of forming impressions about an individual:237 automatic 
associations between particular groups and particular traits offer 
cognitive shortcuts in the immensely complex task of processing 
information.238 Thus, for example, upon encountering an African 
American—even for mere milliseconds239—stereotypes that have 
accrued in an individual since infancy might come to mind.240 
They might include traits such as violence, weaponry, hostility, 
 
 234 See Kunda and Thagard, 103 Psychological Rev at 284 (cited in note 185). 
 235 See id.  
 236 See id. 
 237 See Peter Glick, Cari Zion, and Cynthia Nelson, What Mediates Sex Discrimina-
tion in Hiring Decisions?, 55 J Personality & Soc Psychology 178, 179 (1988) 
(“[P]erceivers seem to prefer to fit others into a category, if possible, rather than process 
information about them in a piecemeal fashion.”). 
 238 See Nelson, Acker, and Manis, 32 J Experimental Soc Psychology at 13 (cited in 
note 230) (“As a standard component of our cognitive repertoire, stereotypes reward their 
user with speed and efficiency in perception, inference, and decision-making.”); Casey, et 
al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias at *1 (cited in note 213) (noting that implicit-
social-cognition research “shows that individuals develop implicit attitudes and stereo-
types as a routine process of sorting and categorizing the vast amounts of sensory infor-
mation they encounter on an ongoing basis”). 
 239 See Patrick S. Forscher and Patricia G. Devine, Breaking the Prejudice Habit: 
Automaticity and Control in the Context of a Long-Term Goal, in Jeffrey W. Sherman, 
Bertram Gawronski, and Yaacov Trope, eds, Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind 
468, 469 (Guilford 2014) (“Once acquired, the biases are [ ] frequently activated due to 
the saturation of stereotypic information within the social environment. These biases 
then become overlearned to the point that, even if they are not perfectly automatic, they 
are activated as quickly as 300–600 milliseconds after cue onset.”) (citation omitted). 
 240 See Ziva Kunda, et al, The Dynamic Time Course of Stereotype Activation: Activa-
tion, Dissipation, and Resurrection, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology 283, 295 (2002).  
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aggression, immorality, or guilt.241 In a two-step process, stereo-
types that have come to mind (or that have been activated) may 
be applied to individuals and thus play a part in forming im-
pressions.242 A lack of individuating information about an indi-
vidual makes it particularly easy for stereotypes to dominate the 
process of forming impressions.243 
Individuation is a strategy that “relies on preventing stereo-
typic inferences by obtaining specific information about group 
members.”244 A variety of studies have suggested that individu-
ating information, such as information about an individual’s 
background,245 can reduce the influence of stereotypes on the 
formation of impressions.246 
B. Applicability of Individuation to Defendants’ Testimony 
Various aspects of research into individuation suggest its 
potential applicability to the context of defendant testimony and 
its potential as a means of attempting to combat the threat of 
implicit fact finder stereotypes. 
First, individuation research has produced promising find-
ings regarding the ability of individuating information to combat 
 
 241 See text accompanying notes 183–87, 191. 
 242 See Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 290–91 (cited in note 240). 
 243 See Kang, et al, 59 UCLA L Rev at 1160 (cited in note 170) (“When we lack suffi-
cient individuating information . . . we have no choice but to rely more heavily on our 
schemas.”); Wayne Chan and Gerald A. Mendelsohn, Disentangling Stereotype and Person 
Effects: Do Social Stereotypes Bias Observer Judgment of Personality?, 44 J Rsrch Personal-
ity 251, 251 (2010) (“When there is no or minimal individuating information about the tar-
get, i.e., when group identification constitutes the only differentiating information availa-
ble, it will necessarily be determining.”); Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 51 J Soc Issues 
at 182 (cited in note 205) (“The research to date suggests that stereotypes are more likely 
to influence impressions and evaluations when perceivers have either minimal or am-
biguous individuating information about a particular person.”). 
 244 Devine, et al, 48 J Experimental Soc Psychology at 1271 (cited in note 233). See 
also id (“Using this strategy helps people evaluate members of the target group based on 
personal, rather than group-based, attributes.”). 
 245 See, for example, Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 284 (cited in 
note 240).  
 246 See, for example, Chan and Mendelsohn, 44 J Rsrch Personality at 255 (cited in 
note 243) (finding that individuating information had a strong influence on the study 
participants’ descriptions of individuals, even when those individuals were labeled ac-
cording to their ethnicity and their gender); id at 256 (noting that when details of indi-
viduals’ behavior were provided to study participants, stereotypes were attenuated and 
participants “anchor[ed] on the individual in making their judgments”); Kunda and 
Thagard, 103 Psychological Rev at 291–92 (cited in note 185) (reporting that stereotypes 
that otherwise affect study participants’ impressions of an individual’s traits “typically 
have no such effects when the individual is [ ] known to have engaged in an unambigu-
ous behavior that is clearly” relevant to the judgment in question). 
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the implicit stereotyping of African Americans.247 It is the implic-
it stereotyping of African Americans that appears most threat-
ening to the presumption of innocence, in light of cognitive asso-
ciations between African Americans and violence, weaponry, 
hostility, aggression, immorality, and guilt.248 
Second, individuation research has included studies of indi-
viduals engaged in the same basic task that defendants perform 
on the stand: talking about themselves and their experiences.249 
For example, in one study, researchers assessed the extent to 
which African American stereotypes held by one group of study 
participants had been brought to mind—or “activated”—after just 
fifteen seconds of exposure to an African American student.250 The 
other group of study participants listened to the African American 
student talk about her experiences for twelve minutes before 
their levels of stereotype activation were assessed.251 Stereotypes 
had been activated after just fifteen seconds, but after twelve 
minutes there was no evidence of stereotype activation.252 As the 
study’s authors described their results, “[t]he initially activated 
stereotype had dissipated over time.”253 In another study, partic-
ipants read a five-page transcript of a telephone conversation in 
which the stereotyped individual described his or her experienc-
es and actions in three situations.254 Having read the conversa-
tion, the study participants relied on the details about the indi-
vidual’s behavior in evaluating his or her traits, rather than on 
stereotypes.255 
Third, the process of supplying individuating information is 
particularly vital when the stereotyped individual is a member 
 
 247 See, for example, Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 295 (cited in 
note 240). 
 248 See text accompanying notes 184–91. 
 249 See, for example, Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 285 (cited in 
note 240). 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id at 286. 
 253 Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 286 (cited in note 240). See 
also id at 295 (suggesting that “as the encounter with the stereotyped individual unfold-
ed, participants shifted their attention from this individual’s membership in a stereo-
typed group to other aspects of this individual or to the task at hand”). 
 254 Anne Locksley, et al, Sex Stereotypes and Social Judgment, 39 J Personality & 
Soc Psychology 821, 822 (1980). 
 255 See id at 825–26 (noting that there were “no effects of sex stereotypic beliefs on 
subjects’ predictions about the target’s personality characteristics”). 
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of an out-group vis-à-vis those harboring the stereotypes256—in 
other words, when those harboring the stereotype do not belong 
to the stereotyped group.257 The process of forming an impression 
of someone from a different racial group is particularly likely to 
involve a surfeit of attention to stereotypes and a lack of atten-
tion to unique characteristics.258 As discussed above, disparities 
in both the fact finder pool and the defendant pool mean that 
fact finder judgments of criminal defendants frequently involve 
an in-group/out-group dynamic and thus an enhanced need for 
individuating information.259 
Fourth, there is some indication that people pay more atten-
tion to individuating information about a stereotyped person 
when they are motivated to form an accurate impression of that 
person.260 Research into jurors indicates that, in general, they 
arrive at the courthouse eager to perform their duties well261 and 
thus are likely to feel such motivation. 
 
 256 See Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-
Conscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 Am Crim L Rev 1541, 1559 (2012): 
Race-based out-grouping has predictable implications . . . (such as whites per-
ceiving blacks as presumptively dangerous and culpable), but also some less 
well-recognized consequences. For instance, people tend to notice the unique 
and individual characteristics of familiar, in-group members, whereas they are 
prone to focus on the stereotypical, group-based characteristics of out-group in-
dividuals. When a white person encounters another white, he or she does not 
focus on the other’s race, but instead processes the unique, individuating at-
tributes (both physical and personal) of the other person. By contrast, when a 
white interacts with a black stranger (or vice versa), psychological processing 
of the other is much more likely to emphasize race and attributes that are im-
plicitly associated with race (such as “threat”), and to downplay personal traits 
that do not conform to racial stereotypes. 
(citations omitted). 
 257 See id. 
 258 See id.  
 259 See text accompanying notes 197–202. See also Levinson, Smith, and Young, 89 
NYU L Rev at 565 (cited in note 186) (“One of the social groups for which people show 
the strongest and most consistent preferences is the racial in-group.”); id (“[I]n-group 
members . . . receive the cognitive benefit of the doubt in a range of [ ] situations, simply 
by virtue of their group membership.”). 
 260 See Kunda, Social Cognition at 366 (cited in note 183). 
 261 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 Mich L Rev 1387, 1390 (2003) 
(“When people are chosen to serve on a jury, they are generally anxious to perform their 
task well, and eager for guidance on how to be a good jury.”); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are 
Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L & Contemp Probs 205, 208, 223 (Autumn 1989) 
(describing a study in which mock jurors “t[ook] the law seriously”). 
 878  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:835 
   
C. Applying Individuation to the Impeachment Context 
This Section proposes that arguments about individuation 
could be made under the “importance of the defendant’s testi-
mony” factor of the impeachment analysis, and it explores the 
potential benefits of this opportunity. 
While fact finders and criminal defendants would ideally 
live in a world where impeachment of criminal defendants with 
their prior convictions had been abolished, that is unlikely to 
happen in the near future. Many commentators have advocated 
its abolition,262 but to no avail.263 So, too, the Mahone factors are 
unlikely to be supplanted as the leading means by which courts 
resolve the question whether prior conviction impeachment 
should be permitted. These factors survived the enactment of 
the FRE,264 have been adopted by all but two of the federal cir-
cuits,265 have been used even in arguments and decisions in the 
two circuits that have not adopted them,266 and have survived 
 
 262 See generally, for example, Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96 
BU L Rev (forthcoming 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9XH6-L79Q. See also, for ex-
ample, Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 Georgetown L J Ann Rev Crim Proc iii, xliii 
(2015) (“I’d amend Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) . . . to preclude impeachment of a 
criminal defendant . . . with evidence of his past criminal convictions.”); Bellin, 76 U Cin 
L Rev at 882–83 (cited in note 147) (proposing the prohibition of “impeachment-only evi-
dence,” such as illegally obtained evidence and prior convictions, in most circumstances); 
Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction 
between Personality and Situation, 43 Duke L J 816, 825 (1994) (advocating a “simple 
rule against character impeachment evidence of a criminal defendant”). 
 263 See McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at 
§ 609App.100 at 609App.-20 (cited in note 25) (“[T]here appears no substantial support for 
entirely eliminating proof of all convictions in attacking credibility.”); Surratt, 31 Syracuse 
L Rev at 914 (cited in note 8) (noting that the “adoption by most other American jurisdic-
tions” of the Hawaiian ban on prior conviction impeachment, “at least in the near future, 
seems unlikely”). 
 264 See text accompanying notes 46–49. 
 265 See text accompanying note 51. 
 266 See, for example, United States v Kieffer, 2009 WL 973350, *2 (D ND) (consider-
ing the factors in balancing probative value and prejudicial effect); Brief of Appellant, 
United States v Hammond, Docket No 99-4167, *15–16 (4th Cir filed May 25, 1999) 
(available on Westlaw at 1999 WL 33616112) (showing the defendant urging the court to 
use the factors in balancing probative value and prejudicial effect); Sindram Govern-
ment Brief at *29 (cited in note 116) (showing the Government urging the court to use 
the factors in balancing probative value and prejudicial effect); Appellee’s Brief, United 
States v Hamilton, Docket No 93-5393, *30–31 (4th Cir filed Sept 24, 1993) (available on 
Westlaw at 1993 WL 13037357) (same); Appellee’s Brief, United States v Stotler, Docket 
No 93-5054, *20 (4th Cir filed July 12, 1993) (available on Westlaw at 1993 WL 
13119772) (same). 
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the arguments of commentators and advocates that some or all 
of them should be abandoned.267 
As described above, one portion of the case law underlying 
Mahone currently lies dormant. It used to offer protection to the 
defendant—and to the fact-finding process—by cautioning 
against impeachment, even in the face of the results of the 
probative/prejudicial balancing test, if the defendant’s testimony 
would be important to the process of getting to the truth.268 In 
courtrooms where components of criminal charges—and even the 
very question of criminal guilt—are being prejudged by fact find-
ers because of implicit stereotypes, the fact-finding process risks 
straying very far from the truth and very far from the presump-
tion of innocence.269 This appears to be the case in the dispropor-
tionately large group of trials that involve African American de-
fendants, a group whose disproportionate representation in the 
courthouse already poses a fairness problem.270 
The possibility of clearing a path for arguments about the im-
portance of individuating testimony within the impeachment con-
text offers something that appears to be vital in combating implic-
it stereotypes, namely, finding methods that do not require 
additional resources or new structures.271 Revivifying the “im-
portance of the defendant’s testimony” factor as one that is availa-
ble for the defense—and as one that is not viewed as a distraction 
 
 267 See text accompanying notes 99–111. 
 268 See Part I.B.  
 269 See John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in Susan T. Fiske, 
Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey, eds, 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 1084, 
1085 (Wiley 5th ed 2010) (“In general, stereotypes produce a readiness to perceive behav-
iors or characteristics associated with the stereotype; when stereotypes are activated, 
individual group members are judged in terms of group-based expectations or stand-
ards.”); Levinson, Cai, and Young, 8 Ohio St J Crim L at 190, 207–08 (cited in note 191). 
See also Part II.A. 
 270 See, for example, Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1006 (cited in note 180):  
African-Americans are arrested for drug offenses at an alarmingly higher rate 
than their white counterparts, despite similar rates of involvement. . . . Once in 
the system, the disparate treatment continues. Prosecutors have ultimate dis-
cretion to determine whether to charge an arrestee and, if so, with what 
charge. Studies suggest both factors are influenced by the race of the accused. 
See also Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Disparity’ (USA To-
day, Nov 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/252R-GDEN (describing how African 
Americans are “more likely to be arrested than any other racial group in the USA”); 
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears—on the Social 
Construction of Threat, 80 Va L Rev 503, 530 (1994) (mentioning the disproportionate 
number of African Americans on death row, convicted by juries, and in jail). See also text 
accompanying notes 192–202. 
 271 See text accompanying notes 230–31. 
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from “the real issues that should be considered”272 or as one that 
merely gets balanced out by the “centrality of the credibility is-
sue” factor273—would both use and help restore meaning to an 
existing structure. 
This Article therefore proposes that the “importance of the 
defendant’s testimony” factor be reclaimed by the defense, and 
be taken seriously by the judiciary, as a vehicle for arguments 
that have the potential to tackle one of our most pressing court-
house problems. Specifically, this Article proposes that defense 
attorneys make creative use of the opportunity to explain that 
implicit stereotyping threatens the presumption of innocence, as 
well as the accurate determination of the truth.274 It proposes 
that in determining, under Mahone, whether permitting im-
peachment might chill defendant testimony, courts should con-
sider the possibility that defendant testimony would offer the 
kind of individuating information that has the potential to com-
bat stereotyping, and courts should weigh this possibility as a 
factor militating against allowing impeachment. 
This proposal offers additional advantages beyond the resto-
ration of meaning and sense to the Mahone framework and the 
countering of implicit stereotyping. For example, even if defense 
arguments fail to persuade the court that the individuating po-
tential of the defendant’s testimony should militate against 
permitting impeachment, they have significant potential to edu-
cate the court about the dangers of implicit stereotyping on the 
part of the fact finder. Two of the most prominent members of 
the criminal defense bar—Professors Jonathan Rapping and 
Bryan Stevenson—have recently advocated the importance of 
 
 272 Sampsell-Jones, 93 Minn L Rev at 1362 (cited in note 111). 
 273 See text accompanying notes 67–68, 73, 107.  
 274 This Article is restricted to the consideration of implicit racial stereotypes, and 
particularly those targeting African Americans, but its arguments have potential ap-
plicability for other stereotyped groups. See, for example, Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing 
STD Surveillance: Toward Better Informed Sexual Consent, 12 Yale J Health Pol, L & 
Ethics 1, 29–30 (2012): 
Increased availability of information might shift decisionmakers away from re-
lying on troubling group-based stereotypes, permitting them to make more ac-
curate information-assisted individuated judgments. More reliable information 
has the double effect of facilitating more accurate, and less biased, deci-
sionmaking. Judgments are based on individualized assessments, rather than 
group stereotypes. 
(citation omitted).  
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educating courts about implicit bias275 through methods that in-
clude motions practice.276 Rapping points out that even if a mo-
tion on such a subject were unsuccessful, “the process of making 
this request would serve to [ ] educate the court” about implicit 
racial bias “and the potentially destructive role it plays in the 
fair administration of justice.”277 Stevenson reaches a similar 
conclusion.278 
A second set of advantages would result if this revivifying of 
the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor were to lead 
to a greater proportion of defendants testifying, whether they 
would otherwise have resolved their cases through guilty pleas 
or through trials at which they sat mute. Decreasing the huge 
proportion of cases that are resolved through guilty pleas in fa-
vor of an increased proportion of cases that go to trial would help 
to ensure that the government’s evidence and conduct are sub-
jected to a greater level of scrutiny.279 Decreasing the large pro-
portion of trials at which defendants sit mute, in favor of an in-
creased proportion of trials at which they offer narratives, offers a 
number of advantages. First, despite instructions to the contrary, 
 
 275 See Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1022–23 (cited in note 180); Ronald J. 
Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Notwithstanding President Obama’s 
Election, 37 N Ky L Rev 243, 268–69 (2010) (describing suggestions by Stevenson that 
“counsel should make change of venue motions based on studies . . . which find that cer-
tain types of people are likely to view African Americans as prone to engage in criminal 
conduct; automatic but implicit associations of African Americans with other negative 
characteristics; and polling data,” and noting that, for example, “defense counsel could 
argue that the defendant would have to overcome a presumption of guilt for young men 
of color”). 
 276 See Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1023 (cited in note 180) (“[E]ven if 
trial courts are reluctant in the short term to allow defense counsel to pursue all of these 
strategies, through the process of demanding and litigating these requests, counsel can 
begin to educate the court and raise awareness of this concept.”); id (“While the Supreme 
Court has made it difficult to raise the issue of race in the litigation of criminal proce-
dure, [implicit-racial-bias] studies may provide a new avenue through which to do so.”) 
(citation omitted); id at 1027 (urging defenders to “look for openings to raise [implicit ra-
cial bias] broadly in their motions practice”).  
 277 Id at 1029–30 (discussing the example of motions asking that potential jurors 
take the IAT, a computerized tool designed to raise awareness of implicit bias). 
 278 Tabak, 37 N Ky L Rev at 269 (cited in note 275) (describing Stevenson’s argu-
ment that “even if such a motion loses, by making and litigating the motion you may af-
fect the dynamics and the postures, attitudes, and thinking of everybody involved, in-
cluding the District Attorney and the judge”). The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill School of Government has created a manual for comprehensive litigation of 
racial-bias issues in North Carolina. See generally Alyson A. Grine and Emily Coward, 
Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina Criminal Cases (UNC School of Government, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FL9P-B46A. 
 279 See text accompanying note 148. 
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invocations of the right to silence appear to lead to assumptions 
of guilt.280 Second, as Professor Blume’s research into exonerees 
shows, stories of innocence are currently being kept from fact 
finders.281 Third, whether or not defendants have stories of inno-
cence to offer, they have details of their lives to offer that may be 
essential to a fair resolution of the case and that may be a useful 
part of the jurors’ education.282 The life experiences of those who 
are able to sit on a jury may well be far removed from those 
whose fates they determine.283 A failure to understand the life 
experiences of others may destroy both the ideal of a jury of 
one’s peers and the reality of a fair judgment.284 One of the lead-
ing scholars of the law of evidence—Judge Weinstein285—
concluded that he would be more likely to bring a fair resolution 
to a conspiracy case if he visited the housing project at which the 
conspiracy was alleged to have occurred.286 Defendant testimony 
can offer analogous glimpses of a different life that may assist 
fact finders—not only as they make their decisions in the court-
house but also as they play their parts in the broader citizenry, 
offering their contributions to policy debates.287 
 
 280 See text accompanying notes 149–51. 
 281 See text accompanying notes 155–56. 
 282 See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 
74 Fordham L Rev 1683, 1717 (2006).  
 283 See text accompanying notes 197–98.  
 284 See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal 
Convictions, 98 Minn L Rev 592, 644–45 (2013). 
 285 See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Jack B. Weinstein, and Margaret A. Berger, 1 
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States 
Courts xxvii (Matthew Bender 2d ed 2014). 
 286 This was a case resolved by plea and thus without defendant testimony. See Tom 
Hays, Veteran Federal Judge Visits Drug Gang’s NYC Turf (USA Today, Mar 5, 2011), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7C37-KCV4 (“Weinstein, who’s overseeing the case against 
the crack cocaine crew, had decided it was important to leave his chambers, don his dark 
overcoat and fedora and visit the defendants’ former turf.”); id (containing the comment 
that Weinstein is “unusual”). 
 287 See Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *6 (cited in note 211) (“Black Americans’ 
negative encounters with the criminal justice system and greater recognition of the root 
causes of crime temper their preference for punitive policies. White Americans, by con-
trast, have less frequent and more positive criminal justice contact, [and] endorse more in-
dividualistic causal explanations of crime.”). These gaps in experiences and resulting atti-
tudes could, in some circumstances, be addressed by defendant testimony. See Roberts, 98 
Minn L Rev at 644 (cited in note 284) (“Making social realities understood is a step to-
ward their reform.”). 
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IV.  RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
This Part addresses four potential objections to this Article’s 
proposals. The first is that developments in the doctrine have 
made the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor moot, 
and thus that it is not available as a heading under which indi-
viduation arguments can be made. The other three objections all 
assume that the factor is available for such arguments, but they 
question whether its use for such arguments is worthwhile. Spe-
cifically, they ask whether there are other means of providing 
individuating information that would be just as effective as de-
fendant narratives, whether the proposal’s benefits are out-
weighed by the risks, and whether this change would affect so 
many cases as to place an undue burden on the prosecution. 
A. Case Law Has Not Mooted the Factor 
Some commentators and judges are likely to resist the no-
tion that content can be reinserted into the “importance of the 
defendant’s testimony” factor, since they view that factor as hav-
ing become moot in light of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in 
Luce. They point out that as a result of Luce, a defendant has no 
right to bring an appeal based on improper impeachment unless 
the defendant testifies.288 They argue that since the defendant 
will already have testified by the time a viable appeal is mount-
ed, the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor can no 
longer encompass the question whether permitting impeach-
ment will chill testimony.289 
The claims of mootness are misguided. First, several states 
do not follow Luce.290 Second, even in those that do, and in the 
federal system, trial judges can still ask the question that this 
 
 288 Luce, 469 US at 43. 
 289 See text accompanying note 102.  
 290 See, for example, Wallace v State, 160 S3d 1184, 1187 (Miss App 2014); State v 
Swanson, 707 NW2d 645, 654 (Minn 2006); State v Whitehead, 517 A2d 373, 377 (NJ 
1986); People v Contreras, 108 AD2d 627, 628 (NY App 1985); Commonwealth v Richard-
son, 500 A2d 1200, 1203–04 (Pa Super 1985); State v McClure, 692 P2d 579, 584 n 4 (Or 
1984) (“We respectfully disagree [with Luce]. We prefer the motion in limine practice sug-
gested in our opinion.”). States that do follow Luce include Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. 
See, for example, State v Wickham, 796 P2d 1354, 1357 (Alaska 1990); State v Allie, 710 
P2d 430, 437 (Ariz 1985); State v Harrell, 506 A2d 1041, 1046 (Conn 1986); Fennell v 
State, 691 A2d 624, 626 (Del 1997); State v Derby, 800 NW2d 52, 58–60 (Iowa 2011); 
People v Finley, 431 NW2d 19, 25 (Mich 1988); State v Hunt, 475 SE2d 722, 726–27 (NC 
App 1996); State v Silvia, 898 A2d 707, 720 (RI 2006); State v Glenn, 330 SE2d 285, 286 
(SC 1985); State v Gentry, 747 P2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987). 
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Article urges should be asked: Would permitting impeachment 
chill defendant testimony that is important for the fact finder to 
hear? 
It is certainly true that one could read the language of 
Luce—“We hold that to raise and preserve for review the claim 
of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant 
must testify”291—as prohibiting any sort of objection to im-
peachment before defendant testimony has begun. Indeed, one 
district court has settled on this interpretation, refusing to make 
an in limine ruling about prior conviction impeachment.292 This 
interpretation is flawed, however, and it has not won out: Luce 
itself permitted the making of an in limine motion, but it simply 
denied that there was a right to appellate review when the de-
fendant did not testify.293 The district court in United States v 
LaTray294 considered, but rightly rejected, a reading of Luce that 
would mean that no motion on impeachment could be made in 
advance of defendant testimony,295 and numerous other decisions 
are in accord. Some courts do not require that the defendant tes-
tify before they will issue a final ruling on whether impeach-
ment will be permitted,296 and some go as far as to favor pretrial 
resolution of this issue, stating that to delay a ruling would un-
fairly prejudice the defendant.297 Judge Weinstein recommends 
 
 291 Luce, 469 US at 43. 
 292 United States v Chew, 1993 WL 38400, *2 (ED Pa) (citing Luce in support of a 
pretrial decision to refuse to rule on the admissibility of the defendant’s prior convictions 
under FRE 609(a) when the defendant had not yet taken the stand). See also United 
States v Campbell, 2009 WL 595980, *5 (ED Tenn) (“[A]ny ruling on the admissibility of 
such evidence, [must] necessarily await its attempted admission, if any, at trial and ar-
guments at that time.”). 
 293 Luce, 469 US at 41 & n 4. See also United States v LaTray, 1989 WL 143355, 
*3 (NDNY). 
 294 1989 WL 143355 (NDNY). 
 295 Id at *3. 
 296 See, for example, United States v Smith, 2006 WL 618843, *3 (ED Pa) (granting a 
pretrial motion to preclude impeachment by prior conviction); United States v Coleman, 
2011 WL 2619543, *10 (D NJ) (deferring a ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions 
until the defendant “either announce[d] he intend[ed] to testify, or actually testifie[d]”). 
 297 See, for example, United States v Savoy, 889 F Supp 2d 78, 118 (DDC 2012) 
(“Pre-trial determination of impeachment questions is generally preferable so that the 
parties may make strategic decisions accordingly.”); United States v Gatto, 746 F Supp 
432, 474 (D NJ 1990), revd on other grounds, 924 F2d 491 (3d Cir 1991) (noting that 
“under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this court must determine 
[the defendant’s] pretrial motion before trial, unless the court, for good cause, orders that 
it be deferred for determination at the trial,” and finding no good cause) (quotation 
marks omitted); United States v D’Agata, 646 F Supp 390, 393 (ED Pa 1986):  
Weighing these factors, I cannot bring myself to deny D’Agata a fair opportunity 
to defend himself by testifying, if he wishes to do so. That would be the practical 
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that a pretrial determination about the admissibility of prior 
convictions for impeachment be made “whenever possible.”298 In 
addition, even if trial judges are unwilling to declare a defend-
ant’s testimony important before they know its content,299 this 
Article’s proposal is that, regardless of content, defendants can 
argue that their testimony is important as a means of combating 
implicit stereotyping. Thus, the factor would become easier to 
assess, even in advance of testimony. 
B. The Use of This Factor for Individuation Arguments Is 
Worthwhile 
Even once it is shown that this factor is available for the 
purpose laid out in this Article, various arguments could be 
made that its use for this purpose is not worthwhile. This Sec-
tion responds to three variants of this objection. 
1. Defendant testimony is one of several important ways of 
attempting individuation. 
Even if one accepts the potential benefits of individuation as 
a means of combating implicit stereotyping, the argument might 
be made that individuation can be accomplished just as effec-
tively through means other than defendant testimony, and 
therefore that no adjustments need to be made to the impeach-
ment analysis. Perhaps, for example, testimony about the de-
fendant from other witnesses, or the defendant’s own alleged 
statements, could serve the purpose equally well. 
 
effect of allowing this impeachment. . . . While I could probably wait until 
D’Agata testified to decide this issue, it would be unfair to do so. The uncer-
tainty would chill his exercising the right to testify. 
See also United States v Graves, 2006 WL 1997378, *2 (ED Pa) (“Although the Court can-
not anticipate what the substance of this testimony might be, the Court concludes that [the 
importance] factor weighs strongly against admitting the 1993 conviction.”); United States 
v O’Driscoll, 2003 WL 1401891, *2 (MD Pa) (“We cannot determine at this time the im-
portance of O’Driscoll’s testimony. However, we assume that O’Driscoll and his counsel 
consider it important that he testify. That factor weighs in favor of exclusion.”). 
 298 McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 609.22 
at 609-67 (cited in note 25) (“The admissibility of convictions should be determined be-
fore trial whenever possible. An advance ruling will assist counsel presenting the wit-
ness whose conviction will be introduced to make appropriate tactical decisions, includ-
ing, for example, how to handle the opening statement or whether the witness should 
testify.”) (citation omitted). 
 299 See, for example, Campbell, 2009 WL 595980 at *5. See also text accompanying 
notes 106–09. 
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This Article is not asserting that in every case—or even in 
every case in which implicit stereotypes threaten the presump-
tion of innocence—defendants should testify. It is certainly true 
that, at least according to conventional wisdom, nothing brings 
the defendant to life as an individual as effectively as his or her 
testimony,300 and individuating information other than defend-
ant testimony may struggle to meet the relevance require-
ment.301 But defense attorneys do and should seek other means 
of bringing their clients to life as individuals in the courtroom,302 
whether through voir dire,303 through evidence other than de-
fendant testimony,304 or through their interactions with their cli-
ents.305 And social-cognition research supports the idea that in-
dividuation can be accomplished through means other than an 
individual narrative from a stereotyped individual. In some 
studies, for example, an individual narrative about, rather than 
from, a stereotyped individual helped to lessen the effects of stereo-
types on the participants’ judgments of that individual.306 Thus, 
 
 300 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1451–52 (cited in note 88). 
 301 See FRE 401. 
 302 See, for example, Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1023–42 (cited in note 
180) (offering examples of ways in which creative defense lawyers can address implicit 
racial bias, including “motions practice, voir dire, use of experts, narrative, jury instruc-
tions, and sentencing advocacy”). 
 303 See H. Mitchell Caldwell and Adrienne M. Hewitt, Shades of Guilt: Combating 
the Continuing Influence upon Jury Selection of Racial Stereotyping in Post-Batson Tri-
als, 38 Am J Trial Advoc 67, 103–16 (2014) (offering techniques available during voir 
dire, the opening statement, and the direct examination of the defendant that can be 
used to combat racial stereotypes, in light of the fact that “the optimal method of break-
ing down a stereotypic view of an outgroup member by members of an ingroup, is to 
identify individual aspects of the outgroup member’s character that exist beyond racial 
identification”); id at 112–13 (providing a sample direct examination that aims “to identi-
fy individual aspects of the outgroup member’s character beyond any [ ] racial identifica-
tion” and, specifically, that “probes aspects of [the] client’s life that help identify [him] as 
an individual rather than just as a black male”). 
 304 See Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence to 
Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U Pitt L Rev 227, 257–58 (2004) (discussing the 
value of character evidence introduced through other witnesses). 
 305 See id at 257. 
 306 See, for example, Kenneth R. Chapman, Donald P. Tashkin, and David J. Pye, 
Gender Bias in the Diagnosis of COPD, 119 Chest 1691, 1692–93 (2001) (finding that 
gender differences in the diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, a disease 
more commonly diagnosed in men, were greatly decreased when physicians were provid-
ed with objective spirometry data in addition to patient-reported symptoms); Locksley, et 
al, 39 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 826–31 (cited in note 254) (describing a study in 
which participants were provided with a brief description of a single behavioral event, 
and in which the effect of sex stereotypes on trait attributions virtually disappeared 
when that brief description contained relevant information). 
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defendant testimony is not the only way of attempting individu-
ation but is an important tool in an important tool set. 
2. The risks do not outweigh the benefits. 
Another possible objection is that this proposal offers only 
limited benefit, and that the benefit is outweighed by the risk. 
To start with the limited benefit, it is undeniable that neither 
this proposal nor any other can be a panacea. Stereotypes are 
enforced daily, in a variety of ways: as Professor Kang puts it, 
they “come from our experiences with other people, some of them 
direct (i.e., real-world encounters) but most of them vicarious 
(i.e., relayed to us through stories, books, movies, media, and 
culture).”307 They run rampant in the criminal courtroom.308 The 
proposals in this Article are envisaged as part of a multifaceted 
strategy to combat implicit stereotypes in criminal trials.309 For 
example, the provision of individuating information is most like-
ly to succeed in combating implicit stereotyping when it is com-
bined with other techniques, such as the provision of infor-
mation about implicit bias310 and efforts to inspire internal 
motivation to combat it.311 An earlier article by this author laid 
out a possible method by which juror education might both im-
part information about implicit bias and inspire internal motiva-
tion to address it,312 and the proposals in this Article are pre-
sented as a complement to—rather than a substitute for—that 
educational proposal.313 
 
 307 Kang, Implicit Bias at *1 (cited in note 159). 
 308 See, for example, Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 835–38 (cited in note 161) (describ-
ing how judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and jury members harbor implicit biases). 
 309 See Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1042 (cited in note 180) (“Educating 
people in the system about their implicit biases and hoping they will be motivated to ad-
dress them is a long term strategy, and only one part of a badly needed, comprehensive 
solution.”). 
 310 See Fazio and Olson, 54 Ann Rev Psychology at 319 (cited in note 165) (“[M]odels 
of correction processes require that individuals be aware of a potential bias in order to 
engage in effortful correction.”) (citation omitted). 
 311 See Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 2 Personality & Soc Psychology Rev at 72 
(cited in note 208) (“One factor that strongly influences the likelihood of individuation is 
the perceiver’s degree of motivation to form accurate, nonstereotypical impressions.”); 
Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 51 J Soc Issues at 187 (cited in note 205) (“[U]nless 
perceivers are especially motivated to attend carefully to target persons, stereotypes 
seem to have priority over individuating information in forming impressions of other 
people.”). 
 312 Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 857–75 (cited in note 161). 
 313 For a discussion of similarly complementary proposals, see Devine, et al, 48 J 
Experimental Soc Psychology at 1270–71 (cited in note 233) (exploring a multifaceted 
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As for risk, skeptics may worry that even though stereo-
types affect assessments of silent defendants, they may wreak 
still more havoc if defendants talk: everything that defendants 
say, and the ways in which they say it, could potentially inspire 
or confirm stereotypes.314 It is certainly true that individuating 
information is not the uncomplicated cure-all that some of the 
literature has suggested.315 Research does indeed indicate that 
stereotypes can affect assessments of individuating information 
just as they affect assessments of individuals316 and that this is 
particularly true when the individuating information is ambigu-
ous.317 In addition, if individuating information about a stereotyped 
individual reveals areas of disagreement between that individual 
and the audience, stereotypes can return to mind and may shape 
 
intervention to help people reduce implicit biases, in which the various strategies, in-
cluding individuation, are “mutually reinforcing”). See also Nelson, Acker, and Manis, 32 
J Experimental Soc Psychology at 35–36 (cited in note 230) (“We suspect that extensive 
exposure to vivid and diagnostic individuating information may eventually weaken the 
effect of a stereotype. This transformation may be encouraged if the social perceiver is 
aware of the potential power of stereotypes to guide his or her thinking in undesirable 
ways.”). 
 314 See Glick, Zion, and Nelson, 55 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 179 (cited in 
note 237) (noting that “[i]ndividuating information that is consistent with stereotypes 
about the social group to which an [individual] belongs may lead others to perceive that 
individual as a prototypical representative” of that group and that, since the prototype 
“may be a more extreme version” of the general stereotype, “[t]his type of individuating 
information may be counter-productive”). 
 315 See, for example, Laurie A. Rudman, Peter Glick, and Julie E. Phelan, From the La-
boratory to the Bench: Gender Stereotyping Research in the Courtroom, in Eugene Borgida 
and Susan T. Fiske, eds, Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom 
83, 95 (Blackwell 2008) (“[T]argets are seldom ‘purely’ personalized (i.e., judged without 
reference to stereotypes), in part because gender categories influence how perceivers elic-
it, interpret, and recall individuating information.”); Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 
51 J Soc Issues at 184 (cited in note 205) (describing research that “disputes the earlier 
view that stereotypes are eliminated in the face of any individuating information”) (em-
phasis added). 
 316 See Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 51 J Soc Issues at 185 (cited in note 205) 
(“The heuristic approach [ ] predicts that categorical information will automatically, per-
haps even unintentionally, influence social judgments despite the presence of individuat-
ing information because the personal data available will be interpreted differently, de-
pending on the stereotype evoked.”). See also Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 19 
Personality & Soc Psychology Bull at 91 (cited in note 207) (“Even the unconscious acti-
vation of a negative stereotype of Blacks may affect the subsequent interpretation of am-
biguously aggressive behavior.”); id at 98 (“The fact that impressions of individuals are 
often based solely on individuating information does not necessarily mean that, in such 
cases, inaccurate stereotypes will have no impact on judgment. They may still affect im-
pressions through the construal of individuating information.”). 
 317 See Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 19 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull at 97 (cit-
ed in note 207) (“Subjects given ambiguous information, whose impressions were affected by 
stereotypes, [ ] relied only on the individuating information. But the individuating infor-
mation that they had in mind was construed differently depending on the stereotype.”). 
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impressions.318 This Article does not argue that defendants should 
testify in every case in which they are the target of stereotypes 
that threaten the presumption of innocence or the right to a fair 
trial. Rather, it proposes that the “importance of the defendant’s 
testimony” factor be restored as an avenue for arguments that 
defendant testimony can aid truth-finding, and it offers individ-
uation as one topic that such arguments could address. Potential 
benefits in this context will always be partial, but they outweigh 
the risks. 
3. This proposal does not impose an unfair burden on the 
prosecution. 
A final objection that might be made is that even though the 
change proposed is a modest one in terms of its operability—no 
new structures or factors need to be implemented—it has exces-
sive reach in that too many trials will be affected. First, a large 
proportion of criminal defendants have felony records.319 Second, 
prosecutors strive to use defendants’ prior convictions as im-
peachment material in the vast bulk of cases that offer them 
that opportunity.320 Third, defendants will be able to argue in a 
great many cases that they are likely to be the targets of nega-
tive implicit stereotypes.321 It might be argued that making it 
easier for a large proportion of defendants to testify, and thus, 
potentially, to be acquitted,322 would impose an unfair burden on 
the prosecution. 
First, it is no bad thing if a more robust set of arguments 
opposing impeachment by prior conviction gives prosecutors 
pause before they proffer prior convictions for this purpose. 
Prosecutors tend to take every opportunity that they can to seek 
 
 318 See Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 289 (cited in note 240) 
(“[T]he Black stereotype was activated for participants who had disagreed with the Black 
person but not for participants who had agreed with him.”). 
 319 See Cohen and Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants at *1 (cited in note 146) (indicat-
ing that in 2006, 43 percent of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest coun-
ties in the country had a felony-conviction record). 
 320 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1461 (cited in note 88) (noting that over 70 per-
cent of defendants who testify are subjected to prior conviction impeachment). 
 321 As stated earlier, implicit biases exist along multiple dimensions. See notes 18, 
274; Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 849 (cited in note 161). 
 322 See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] 
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L Rev 637, 666 (1991) (discussing a subset 
of cases in which “failure to take the stand is utterly disastrous, spelling the difference 
between conviction and acquittal”). 
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impeachment by prior conviction.323 Some have even suggested 
that prosecutors may hope that the fact finder will use such con-
victions for improper purposes.324 As explored in prior work by 
this author, the use of prior convictions to impeach criminal de-
fendants brings more harm than benefit to the fact-finding pro-
cess, and the harm should lead prosecutors to inquire whether 
the frequent proffering of prior convictions is in accord with 
their ethical duty to do justice.325 
Second, it is also no bad thing if this Article’s proposal dis-
rupts the ease with which those who are the targets of implicit 
racial stereotypes are convicted. Convictions are viewed as the 
benchmark of successful prosecution,326 and obstacles in the path 
to conviction can help shift prosecutorial incentives, or at least 
raise prosecutorial awareness.327 It is no bad thing, in other 
words, that a proposal such as this may heighten awareness of 
the fact that current patterns of prosecution track the historical 
lines of subordination that lie at the root of implicit racial stereo-
types.328 It is no bad thing that a proposal such as this may play 
a part in helping to shift the incentives operating on prosecu-
tors, the most powerful participants in the criminal-justice sys-
tem,329 as they make decisions about who will be prosecuted and 
 
 323 See text accompanying notes 133–34, 320. 
 324 See, for example, Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” versus “What Was Done”: When to 
Admit Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 NC L Rev 939, 961–62 (2001) (“It may 
indeed be the hope of unfair prejudice that motivates the prosecution to introduce such 
evidence.”); Bellin, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 296 (cited in note 101) (discussing scholarship 
asserting that prosecutors intend that the evidence be used for propensity purposes). 
 325 See Roberts, 55 BC L Rev at 600–03 (cited in note 87). See also Berger v United 
States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the interest of the government in a criminal 
prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”). 
 326 See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
Cardozo L Rev 2089, 2091 (2010) (“[C]onvictions are the lodestar by which prosecutors tend 
to be judged.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: 
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand L Rev 45, 58–59 (1991) (“[B]ecause [a prosecutor’s] 
success is measured by her conviction rate, she may be tempted to ignore the rights of de-
fendants, victims, or the community in order to obtain pleas or guilty verdicts.”) (citation 
omitted); Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 
Tex L Rev 629, 647 (1972) (“[A]lthough it has often been contended that policemen ‘count’ 
arrests and not convictions, the same thing cannot be said of prosecutors.”). 
 327 For an exploration of the influence of litigation costs on prosecutorial behavior, 
see Alschuler, 50 Tex L Rev at 646–47 (cited in note 326). See also Roberts, 98 Minn L 
Rev at 637–38 (cited in note 284) (discussing proposals to adjust prosecutorial incentives 
in an effort to bring about reform and increase awareness). 
 328 See Roberts, 98 Minn L Rev at 637–38 (cited in note 284). 
 329 See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev 1049, 1078–
79 (2013) (noting that the prosecutor “holds many if not most of the cards, and that 
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brought to trial. If a blossoming of persuasive arguments about 
how the testimony of criminal defendants is vitally important in 
all those many cases in which the defendants are stereotyped as 
criminally inclined adds a little impetus to the urgency of ad-
dressing the causes of disparity in prosecution,330 then so much 
the better. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior conviction impeachment analysis has lost sight of one 
of its foundational factors: the importance of the defendant’s tes-
timony as a means of enhancing the truth-finding function of a 
trial. Confusion in this factor’s application has left it, in the eyes 
of many, a distraction from the real issues at trial. This factor, 
however, is more central than ever. Fact finders are now known 
to harbor implicit racial stereotypes that in many instances 
threaten the presumption of innocence and that individuating 
information offers some hope of ameliorating. Rather than al-
lowing the factor to remain dormant and allowing defendants to 
sit mute because of fears of the impeachment that has become 
the default, this Article urges that the factor be revivified. If 
courts consider the importance of the defendant’s testimony as a 
means of combating implicit stereotypes, both truth-finding and 
the presumption of innocence become a little more achievable. 
 
therefore it makes sense to impose on those powerful players greater responsibilities for 
the overall integrity of the system”). 
 330 See Besiki Kutateladze, Whitney Tymas, and Mary Crowley, Race and Prosecution 
in Manhattan *3 (Vera Institute of Justice, July 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RCU6 
-ZFXN (finding race to be a factor in case outcomes). Note also the influence that prosecu-
tors can exercise over arrest patterns, with a goal of reducing the racial disparity that cur-
rently exists therein. See Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *38 (cited in note 211) 
(recommending more-equitable enforcement policies, particularly for drug crimes); Heath, 
Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates (cited in note 270); NYU School of Law, New Frontiers in 
Race and Criminal Justice—Panel 2: Race and Prosecution 29:58–31:07 (Apr 17, 2012), 
online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUtgqDaJN_g#t=29m58s (visited Nov 21, 2015) 
(Perma archive unavailable) (showing Whitney Tymas saying: “Prosecutors need to under-
stand the real leadership that they can exercise when it comes to not endorsing all police 
action. . . . [I]t’s really OK to tell a police officer, ‘I’m not . . . prosecuting this case.’ . . . 
[P]rosecutors can say no, and . . . not just be case processors—really be leaders.”); Delgado, 
80 Va L Rev at 530 (cited in note 270) (describing racial disparities in the criminal-
justice system). 
